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THE CASE OF KAREN ATALA AND DAUGHTERS:
TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF




The prohibition of discrimination and the guarantee of equal-
ity are cornerstones of the international system of human rights.1
They are fixtures of the most ratified international treaties in the
world2 and are prominently featured in regional instruments.3
† Human Rights Specialist and Attorney, Special Rapporteurship on the Rights of
Women, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; Professional Lecturer in
Law, George Washington University Law School.  The views expressed are solely those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights, those of the Secretary General of the Organization of Ameri-
can States, or those of the Organization of American States.
1 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm. [HRC (Committee)], General Comment
No. 18, Non-Discrimination, ¶¶ 1–3, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (Nov. 10, 1989) [hereinafter
HRC (Committee), General Comment No. 18]; U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights [CESCR Committee], General Comment No. 20, Non-Discrimina-
tion in Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, ¶ 2, E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009)
[hereinafter CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 20]; Yatama v. Nicaragua,
Preliminary Objections, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 127, ¶ 184 (Jun. 23, 2005); Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocu-
mented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶
88 (Sept. 17, 2003); Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report on Terrorism and Human
Rights, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.116 doc. 5 rev. 1 corr., ¶ 335 (Oct. 22, 2002).
2 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 2(1), 26, Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR Convention]; International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, arts. 2(2), 3, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CESCR Convention]; U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 2,
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, arts. 1, 2, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter
CEDAW Convention]; International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination, arts. 1, 2, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
3 See, e.g., Organization of American States [OAS], American Convention on
Human Rights, arts. 1.1, 24, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter American Convention]; Inter-American Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women, arts. 6, 8(b), June 9, 1994,
27 U.S.T. 3301, 1438 U.N.T.S. 63 [hereinafter Convention of Belém do Pará]; Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 14, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; Protocol No. 12 to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1,
Nov. 4, 2000, E.T.S. No. 177; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Banjul
Charter], art. 2, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58; Proto-
col to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in
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They are also found in a number of broadly approved declarations,
resolutions and platforms,4 views from treaty bodies,5 and jurispru-
dence issued by the universal and regional human rights monitor-
ing systems.6
These obligations have also been at the heart of the develop-
ment of legal standards in the realm of women’s rights.7 Even
though women constitute half of the world’s population,8 they
have been subjected historically to inferior treatment on the basis
of their sex9 and still bear the brunt of inequality in their
Africa [Maputo Protocol], art. 2, July 11, 2003 [hereinafter Maputo Protocol], availa-
ble at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f4b139d4.html.
4 See, e.g., World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declara-
tion and Programme of Action, ¶¶ 15, 18, 19, 20–22, 24, 28, 37, 39, 40–41, 63, 91, 95,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993); Declaration on the Elimination of Vio-
lence Against Women, Preamble & art. 3, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/
104 (Feb. 23, 1994); Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Preamble &
arts. 2 & 21, G.A. RES. 61/295, U.N. DOC. A/Res/47/1 (Sept. 13, 2007); Human
Rights Council [HRC (Council)] Res. 17/19, Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and
Gender Identity, 17th Sess., May 30–June 17, 2007, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1
(June 15, 2011).
5 See Comm. on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
[CEDAW Committee], General Recommendation No. 28, Core Obligations of States
Parties Under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women, U.N. Doc. C/2010/47/GC.2 (Oct. 19, 2010) [hereinafter
CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 28]; CESCR Committee, General
Comment No. 20, supra note 1; CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No.
25, Article 4, Paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women (Temporary Special Measures), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/
Rev.7 at 282 (2004) [hereinafter CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No.
25].
6 See, e.g., CEDAW Committee, Communication No. 17/2008, ¶¶ 7.6–7.9, U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008 (Sept. 27, 2011); HRC (Committee), S.W.M. Brooks
v. Netherlands, Communication No. 172/1984, ¶¶ 12.1–16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/29/
D/172/1984 (Apr. 9, 1987); Yatama, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127, ¶¶ 178–229;
Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 130, ¶¶
110–192 (Sept. 8, 2005); Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo Dist. v. Belize,
Case 12.053, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 Doc.
5 rev. 1 ¶¶ 157–171 (2004); D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008).
7 See generally CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 25, supra note
5; CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 28, supra note 5; Declaration
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, Preamble & arts. 3 (b), (d), (e), G.A.
Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Feb. 23, 1994); Fourth World Conference on
Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4–15, 1995, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,
U.N. Docs. A/CONF.177/20 & A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (Sept. 15, 1995).
8 U.N. Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, World Population Prospects, 2010 Revision
(June 28, 2011), http://esa.un.org/wpp/Excel-Data/population.htm (calculations
based on world total population and world female population).
9 See e.g., Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. [IACHR], The Work, Education, and Resources
of Women: The Road to Equality in Guaranteeing Economic, Social, and Cultural
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societies.10
Accordingly, the leading international treaty on this issue—
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (“CEDAW”)—is based on the premise “that wo-
men have suffered, and continue to suffer several forms of discrim-
ination” due to their sex and gender.11 This treaty identifies the
guarantees of non-discrimination and equality as preconditions for
women’s full exercise of their civil, political, economic, social, and
cultural rights.12
Even though the prohibition of discrimination and the guar-
antee of equality span as far as the adoption of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights,13 the definition of their scope in terms of
state obligations is still in development.14 International legal bodies
continue to shed light on the scope of the duty of states to address
discrimination at the national level, how to achieve the general
goal of “equality,” and how these obligations vary according to the
subject of protection.15 This challenging task has mostly been un-
Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.143 Doc. 59, ¶ 4 (Nov. 3, 2011) [hereinafter IACHR, The
Work, Education, and Resources of Women].
10 See e.g., U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, ENDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FROM
WORDS TO ACTION, at 29, 34 & 36, U.N. Sales No. E.06.IV.8 (2006); U.N. WOMEN,
2011–2012 PROGRESS OF THE WORLD’S WOMEN: IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, at 8 (2012);
THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOMENT REPORT 2012: GENDER EQUALITY AND DEVELOP-
MENT, at 13–22 (2012).
11 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 25, supra note 5, ¶ 5. The
Convention not only refers to discrimination on the basis of “sex,” but also on the
basis of “gender.” The term “sex” refers to biological differences between men and
women. The term “gender” alludes to “socially constructed identities, attributes and
roles for women and society’s social and cultural meaning for these biological differ-
ences,” which result in hierarchical relationships between women and men, and in
the unequal distribution of power between men and women. Id.
12 CEDAW Convention, supra note 2, arts. 1–3, 7–14.
13 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
14 See generally CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 20, supra note 1; Comm.
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD], General Recommendation No.
31, Prevention of Racial Discrimination in the Administration and Functioning of the
Criminal Justice System, U.N. Doc. A/60/18 at 98–108 (2005) [hereinafter CERD
Committee, General Recommendation No. 31]; CERD, General Recommendation
No. 32, Meaning and Scope of Special Measures in the International Convention on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/32 (Sept. 24,
2009) [hereinafter CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32]; Clift v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 7205/07, ¶¶ 56–74 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010); Kiyutin v. Russia,
App. No. 2700/10, ¶¶ 56–74 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011); Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Com-
munity v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 214, ¶¶ 265–275 (Aug. 24, 2010).
15 See generally CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 25, supra note
5; CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 28, supra note 5; CERD Com-
mittee, General Recommendation No. 31, supra note 14; CERD Committee, General
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dertaken by United Nations treaty-based bodies and regional
human rights tribunals.16 Such entities are aiming to answer the
question of what it entails for a state to “respect, protect and fulfill”
or to “respect and ensure” women’s right to non-discrimination
and to fully enjoy equality, as well as those of other sectors of the
population.17
The decisions and reports issued by the organs of the Inter-
American human rights system18 are part of this trend of analysis.19
Recommendation No. 32, supra note 14; D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic, App.
No. 57325/00, ¶¶ 175–210 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008); Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02,
¶¶ 183–202 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009); Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case
12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 80/11, ¶¶ 102–114, 160–170 (2011);
Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 4/
01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶¶ 44–52 (2001).
16 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 13; CEDAW Committee,
General Recommendation No. 25, supra note 5; CEDAW Committee, General Recom-
mendation No. 28, supra note 5; CERD Committee, General Recommendation No.
31, supra note 14; CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32, supra note
14; D.H. and Others, App. No. 57325/00, at ¶¶ 175–210; Opuz, App. No. 33401/02, at
¶¶ 183–202; Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales), Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., at ¶¶ 102–114,
160–170; Morales de Sierra, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20
rev. at ¶¶ 44–52.
17 See CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 28, supra note 5; CESCR
Committee, General Comment No. 20, supra note 1; IACHR, Legal Standards Related
to Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System:
Development and Application, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 143 Doc. 60 (Nov. 3, 2011) [herein-
after IACHR, Legal Standards Related to Gender Equality and Women’s Rights];
IACHR, The Work, Education, and Resources of Women, supra note 9. See also sources
cited supra note 16.
18 The Inter-American human rights system is mainly composed of two organs—
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Court—entrusted by the
Member States of the Organization of American States to promote the observance
and defense of human rights throughout the hemisphere. See American Convention,
supra note 3, at arts. 33–73.
The Commission, as part of its mandate, receives, reviews, and investigates indi-
vidual petitions that allege human rights violations, including those with gender-spe-
cific causes, grounded on the obligations contained in key regional human rights
instruments, such as the American Convention, the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, and the Convention of Belém do Pará. Any person, group
of persons, or nongovernmental organization may present a petition to the Commis-
sion alleging violations of the rights protected in the American Convention and other
regional instruments. Petitions can also be presented before the Commission under
the American Declaration in cases involving states that are not states parties to the
American Convention. The Court for its part adjudicates individual cases related to
human rights violations referred to it by the Commission and issues advisory opinions
on matters of legal interpretation. See American Convention, supra note 3, arts. 34–69.
19 See discussion on the development of standards related to the obligations to not
discriminate and to guarantee equality contained in IACHR, Legal Standards Related
to Gender Equality and Women’s Rights, supra note 17; IACHR, The Work, Educa-
tion, and Resources of Women, supra note 9, at 3–25; IACHR, The Situation of People
of African Descent in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 62, at 29–35 (Dec. 5,
2011).
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Both the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“the
Commission”) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(“the Court”) have begun the process of defining the contours of
the obligations not to discriminate and to guarantee equality in the
realm of the rights of women.20 A significant part of this analysis
has been dedicated to shedding light on the scope of articles 1(1)
and 24 of the American Convention; article II of the American
Declaration; and the Inter-American Convention on the Preven-
tion, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women
(“Convention of Belém do Pará”), in light of CEDAW, and other
international instruments and treaties.21 Some important legal de-
velopments within this system since 1994 are noteworthy, including
subjecting distinctions based on sex to “strict scrutiny,” or rigorous
review;22 the consolidation of the link between discrimination and
violence against women and the state’s duty to act with due dili-
gence to address these public problems;23 the negative and positive
components of the state’s obligation to address discrimination at
the national level;24 the recognition of the disproportionate and
discriminatory impact on women of restrictions in the exercise of
their reproductive rights;25 and the identification of gender ele-
ments related to the content and scope of articles 1.1 and 24 of the
20 For more analysis, see IACHR, Legal Standards Related to Gender Equality and
Women’s Rights, supra note 17; Rosa M. Celorio, The Rights of Women in the Inter-Ameri-
can System of Human Rights: Current Opportunities and Challenges in Standard-Setting, 65
U. MIAMI L. REV. 819 (2011).
21 See sources cited supra note 20.
22 Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 4/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 36 (2001).
23 See, e.g., Jessica Lenahan v. United States (Gonzales), Case 12.626, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 80/11 (2011); Marı́a da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil,
Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc.
20 rev. (2001); González v. Mexico (Cotton Field), Preliminary Objection, Merits, Repa-
rations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009);
Fernández Ortega v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215 (Aug. 30, 2010); Rosendo Cantú and
Other v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216 (Aug. 31, 2010).
24 See Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objec-
tions, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 130,
¶ 141 (Sept. 8, 2005) (holding that the right to equal protection of the law and to
non-discrimination mandates that “States must abstain from producing regulations
that are discriminatory or have discriminatory effects on certain groups of population
when exercising their rights.  Moreover, States must combat discriminatory practices
at all levels, particularly in public bodies and, finally, must adopt the affirmative mea-
sures needed to ensure the effective right to equal protection for all individuals.”).
25 Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, Case 12.361, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
85/10, ¶¶ 128–131 (2010).
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American Convention.26
Amidst these legal developments, the Inter-American Commis-
sion ruled on its first case related to discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation on December 18, 2009, in the context of female
victims.27 The decision was issued in the case of Karen Atala and
Daughters vs. Chile (“Karen Atala and Daughters” or “Karen Atala”).28
This case originated with a petition presented before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights on November 24, 2004,
alleging that the Chilean State was responsible for human rights
violations committed in the context of a proceeding where Mrs.
Karen Atala, a well-known judge, lost custody of her three daugh-
ters—M., V., and R.—based on her sexual orientation by means of
a Supreme Court of Justice decision.29 The Commission ruled in
favor of the Petitioners finding a violation of several rights con-
tained in the American Convention, including the right to equal
protection and the obligation not to discriminate; the rights to pro-
tection of the family and privacy; the rights of the child; and the
right to judicial protection and guarantees.30
Upon considering that the State of Chile had not properly
complied with its recommendations, the Commission sent this case
to the Inter-American Court for its contentious review on Septem-
ber 17, 2010.31 The Court for its part issued a landmark ruling on
February 24, 2012, in favor of Karen Atala and M., V., and R.32 In
its ruling, the Court found for the first time that discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity is compre-
hended within the phrase “other social condition” under article 1.1
of the American Convention.33 The Court also presents ground-
breaking analysis in regard to the content of the obligations not to
discriminate and to guarantee equality;34 their link with the right
26 See e.g., Cotton Field, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶¶ 390–402 (Nov. 16,
2009)(indicating how the application of gender-based stereotypes by public officials
in their investigation of violence against women cases contravenes the general obliga-
tion not to discriminate encompassed in Article 1(1) of the American Convention).
27 See Atala and Daughters v. Chile, Application, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Sept. 17,
2010) [hereinafter Atala, Application].
28 Id.
29 Atala and Daughters v. Chile, Petition 1271-04, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 42/08, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.130, doc. 22, rev. 1 ¶¶ 1–2 (2008) [hereinafter Atala,
Petition].
30 See Atala, Application, supra note 27.
31 Id. ¶¶ 24–39.
32 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012).
33 Id. ¶ 91.
34 Id. ¶ 139.
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to privacy and protection of the family of persons;35 the elements
that should inform the pursuance of the best interests of the child
as an imperative objective in custody proceedings;36 and the pres-
ence of prejudices and stereotypes in the actions of justice officials
as contrary to different dispositions contained in the American
Convention, among other considerations.37
The author suggests in this Article that both the Commission’s
and Court’s decisions in the case of Karen Atala and Daughters re-
present key contributions to the development of legal standards in
five key areas related to the obligations not to discriminate, the
guarantee of equality, and the rights of women, including: 1) the
scope and reach of the obligations not to discriminate and to guar-
antee equality under articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Conven-
tion; 2) the features of the “rigorous scrutiny” standard and its
applicability to prohibited factors of discrimination; 3) the prohibi-
tion of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gen-
der identity, and its applicability to individual cases related to
women; 4) the correlation of this prohibition with the rights to
privacy and to protection of the family under international human
rights law; and 5) the content of the bests interests of the child
under international human rights law.
This Article concludes that further definition by the Inter-
American Commission and the Court of the content and scope of
the obligations not to discriminate and to guarantee equality in
individual cases—such as the one related to Karen Atala and Daugh-
ters—is paramount to the development of adequate and effective
international legal standards related to women’s rights.38 These ob-
ligations are of utmost importance as they are not only contained
in articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention, but they consti-
tute the backbone of the Inter-American and universal systems of
human rights. They are also priority women’s rights issues pertain-
ing to civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. It is also
35 Id. ¶ 165.
36 Id. ¶¶ 108–09.
37 Id. ¶¶ 145–46.
38 The Author understands the concept of a “legal standard” as a guideline for the
state involved on how to adequately implement at the national level the binding and
individual rights contained in the governing instruments of the Inter-American sys-
tem of human rights, and other international human rights treaties. Therefore, the
decisions in the Karen Atala case constitute authoritative pronouncements from inter-
national legal bodies related to the scope of the individual articles of the American
Convention linked to the guarantees of non-discrimination and equality. For more
discussion, see generally Celorio, The Rights of Women in the Inter-American System of
Human Rights, supra note 20, at 819.
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paramount to understand the connection between the obligations
not to discriminate and to guarantee equality with the full panoply
of human rights involved in the obligation to respect and guaran-
tee the rights of women, including those related to their sexual
orientation, gender identity, privacy, family, and children. Legal
developments in this sense would also open the door for the Inter-
American Commission and the Court’s resolution of cases involv-
ing forms of discrimination that affect women based on their sex,
and other factors of discrimination still unrecognized as “prohib-
ited” or “suspect” by the international community.
This Article is divided in three parts. First, the Article discusses
the Inter-American Commission’s merits decision in the case of
Karen Atala and Daughters, the Commission’s allegations before the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the Court’s ruling in
this case.   In the second part, it reviews what the Author considers
to be the key contributions of the Commission’s decision and the
Court’s ruling to the development of legal standards in the realms
of discrimination, equality, and women’s rights, in five key areas. In
the third part, the Article closes with some final conclusions and
observations.
II. THE CASE OF KAREN ATALA AND DAUGHTERS: ITS PATH
THROUGH THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
In this section, the Author reviews the processing of the case
of Karen Atala and Daughters through the organs of the Inter-Ameri-
can system of human rights, namely, the Inter-American Commis-
sion and the Court. First, the Article examines the main findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Commission’s merits de-
cision; findings which also constitute the basis for the allegations
brought forth by the Commission before the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights on September 17, 2010.39 The Author analyzes
the resolution of the Commission in the following order: a) allega-
tions presented by the Petitioners and the State of Chile before the
Commission; b) main legal findings and conclusions; c) recom-
39 In cases where the relevant state “has accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court in accordance with article 62 of the American Convention, and the
Commission considers that the State has not complied with the recommendations of
the report approved in accordance with article 50 of the American Convention, it
shall refer the case to the Court, unless there is a reasoned decision by an absolute
majority of the members of the Commission to the contrary.” See Rules of Procedure
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 45(1) (2009), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic18.RulesOfProcedureIACHR.htm.
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mendations issued to the State; and d) processing after merits
report.
Second, the Author analyzes some of the main findings and
conclusions of the Inter-American Court in its judgment of Febru-
ary 24, 2012.
A. Processing of Case before the Inter-American Commission
1. Allegations of the Petitioners and the State
The Petitioners in this case40 alleged before the Commission
that the State of Chile had committed a number of human rights
violations in the context of a custody proceeding in detriment of
Karen Atala and her daughters M., V., and R.41 Petitioners claimed
that said proceeding—initiated by Karen Atala’s former husband—
ended in a ruling by the Supreme Court of Justice of Chile that
revoked Mrs. Karen Atala’s custody of her three daughters—ages 5,
6, and 10 at the time of the events—based exclusively on discrimi-
natory prejudices related to her sexual orientation.42
The Petitioners sustained before the Commission that Karen
Atala married Ricardo Jaime López Allende on March 29, 1993,
and that M., V. and R. were conceived in the course of this relation-
ship.43 The couple decided to end their marriage on March 2002,
establishing by mutual agreement that Karen Atala would maintain
custody of their daughters.44 In June of 2002, Karen Atala initiated
a relationship with a person of the same sex and began cohabiting
with her during November of that year.45
On January 15, 2003, Ricardo Jaime López Allende filed a suit
claiming custody of his daughters with the Juvenile Court of Villar-
ica asserting that Karen Atala “is not capable of watching over and
caring for them [sic], that her new sexual lifestyle choice, in addi-
tion to her cohabiting in a lesbian relationship with another wo-
man, are producing and will necessarily produce harmful
consequences for the development of these minors”46 and referred
to the risk of the children contracting sexually transmitted diseases
40 On August 18, 2008, Mrs. Karen Atala provided the Commission updated infor-
mation on the attorneys that were representing her: Macarena Sáez, Public Liberties.
They are also the representatives for this case before the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. See Atala, Petition, supra note 29, ¶ 1.
41 Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
42 Id. ¶¶ 14–32.
43 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 40.
44 Id.
45 Atala, Petition, supra note 29, ¶ 15.
46 Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 41 n. 15.
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such as herpes and AIDS.47
The Petitioners noted that the custody proceeding was highly
publicized in Chile,48 and consisted of a series of judicial actions,
rising to the level of the Supreme Court of Justice on May 31, 2004,
which granted permanent custody to the father.49 They also
claimed that as a result of the public nature of the custody pro-
ceeding, Karen Atala was the subject of an investigation ordered by
the Chilean justice system, the findings of which were disclosed by
the media, including facts pertaining to her private life.50 The Peti-
tioners also noted that the final report of the judge appointed to
perform this investigation alluded to her sexual orientation, con-
cluding that it damaged the image of both Karen Atala and the
Judicial Branch.51
The Petitioners presented a number of legal claims before the
Commission pertaining to these events.52 They mainly argued that
Karen Atala was discriminated against throughout the custody pro-
ceedings on the basis of prejudicial notions and stereotypes related
to her sexual orientation, rather than afforded an objective evalua-
tion of her capacity to be a fit mother.53  Among its considerations,
the Supreme Court considered that Karen Atala had placed her
own interests before those of her daughters by deciding to cohabit
with a person of the same sex, and this “unique family environ-
ment” posed a risk to their development.54
This decision from the Supreme Court allegedly took place
47 Id.
48 Atala, Petition, supra note 29, ¶ 16.
49 The judicial actions in the process included a decision handed down on May 2,
2003 by the Regular Judge of the Juvenile Court of Villarica granting provisional cus-
tody of the girls to their father; a first instance ruling handed down by the Acting
Judge of the Juvenile Court on October 29, 2003, granting custody to the mother; an
injunction not to move the girls issued by the Court of Appeals in Temuco on Novem-
ber 24, 2003 that prevented the girls from being handed over to their mother; a deci-
sion by the Court of Appeals of Temuco on March 30, 2004 confirming the first
instance decision granting custody to the mother; a second injunction issued by the
Supreme Court of Justice of Chile on April 7, 2004 suspending delivery of the girls to
their mother; and a decision by the Supreme Court of Justice of Chile on May 31,
2004 granting permanent custody to the father. See Atala, Application, supra note 27,
¶¶ 47–65.
50 Id. ¶¶ 44–46 (citing to a report prepared by Judge Lenin Lillo Hunzinker,
Court of Appeals of Terrjuco, April 2, 2003 and Decision of the Court of Appeals of
Terruco, May 9, 2003).
51 Id.
52 See Atala, Petition, supra note 29, ¶¶ 13–32.
53 Id.
54 Id. ¶ 21 (quoting judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of Chile, May 31,
2004).
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even though the factual record—prepared by lower courts that
ruled favorably for Karen Atala—was devoid of any evidence indi-
cating that the girls were indeed harmed by their mother’s cohabi-
tation with a person of the same sex.55 The Petitioners considered
that this judgment was particularly serious in a context where the
Chilean Civil Code contains a presumption of custody in favor of
the mother in cases where parents separate, and limits the grounds
on the basis of which a mother can be deprived of the same.56
At the heart of the case before the Inter-American Commis-
sion, the Petitioners sustained that the Supreme Court discrimi-
nated against Karen Atala due to a distinction based on her sexual
orientation, neither objective nor reasonable, causing irreparable
harm to her and her daughters.57 They alleged that sexual orienta-
tion should be understood as a prohibited factor of discrimination
under the phrase “other social condition” contained in article 1.1
of the American Convention.58
On the basis of this discrimination and prejudice, the Petition-
ers further claimed that the State interfered arbitrarily and abu-
sively in the private and family life of Karen Atala and her
daughters, and that it violated her daughters’ rights as children
due to the biased evaluation of which parent would be more fit to
care for them, which ended up harming them, instead of protect-
ing them.59 The Petitioners also maintained that a series of due
process violations were committed during the custody case, in vio-
lation of articles 8.1 and 25 of the American Convention.60
Throughout the proceedings, the State of Chile argued that
the decision of its Supreme Court of Justice had as its primary ob-
55 Id. ¶ 17.
56 Article 225 of the Civil Code of Chile stipulates: “If the parents live separately,
the mother shall see to the personal care of the children. . . . Be that as it may, when
necessary to protect the interests of the child, whether because of mistreatment, neg-
lect, or another just cause, the judge may transfer the care of the child to the other
parent.” CÓD. CIV. [CIVIL CODE] art. 225. Said article was reportedly the subject of an
extensive parliamentary review to protect the best interests of the child, and to limit
the grounds based on which a mother may be deprived of custody. See Atala, Petition,
supra note 29, ¶ 25.
57 See Atala, Petition, supra note 29, ¶¶ 13–32.
58 Id.
59 Id. ¶ 13.
60 The Petitioners claimed in particular that the State of Chile violated the judicial
protection and guarantees contained in articles 8(1) and 25 of the American Conven-
tion since the Supreme Court of Justice of Chile issued the custody ruling by means of
a disciplinary action (recurso de queja), which is a remedy of a purely disciplinary na-
ture designed to correct the faults or abuses committed in judicial decisions. The
Petitioners propose that, in this way, the Supreme Court opened a third judicial in-
stance that does not exist in the Chilean criminal procedure. See id. ¶ 65.
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jective the protection of the best interests of the girls involved.61
The State sustained that the judgment did not violate the rights of
the girls, since it was based on “the imperative need to protect the
best interests of the daughters, threatened, according to the evi-
dence in the case, by the conduct of the mother, who opted to
cohabit with a partner of the same sex, with whom she proposed to
raise her daughters, which was deemed inadvisable for the girls’
upbringing and a risk to their development given the current cli-
mate in Chilean society.”62
2. Main Legal Findings and Conclusions
The Commission admitted this case on July 23, 2008, finding
that the allegations could constitute violations of articles 24 (right
to equal protection of the law); 11(2) (right to a private life free of
arbitrary or abusive interference); 17(1) (right to protection of the
family); 8(1)(right to a fair trial); 25 (judicial protection and guar-
antees) in detriment of Karen Atala; and articles 19 (rights of the
child) and 17(4) (the balancing of rights between spouses at the
dissolution of marriage) in regard to M., V., and R.63 The Commis-
sion admitted these articles in connection with the obligation to
respect and guarantee all rights free from discrimination con-
tained in article 1.1 (obligation to respect rights and non-discrimi-
nation provision) of the American Convention.64 On December 18,
2009, the Commission issued a merits report finding a violation of
all of these articles. The Commission’s conclusions are summarized
below.
a. Legal Analysis Related to the Rights to Equality and Non-
Discrimination (Articles 24 and 1(1) of the American
Convention)
The Commission concluded that the State of Chile violated
Karen Atala’s right to equal protection free from all forms of dis-
crimination enshrined in article 24 of the American Convention, as
it relates to the duty to respect and guarantee rights as established
in article 1.1.65 In its decision, the Commission undertakes a thor-
ough analysis of the “interrelation, scope, and content” of articles
1.1 and 24 of the American Convention, and then proceeds to ap-
61 Id. ¶ 35.
62 Id. (citing Response of the State of Chile, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dept. of
H.R., June 15, 2005).
63 Atala, Petition, supra note 29, ¶ 4.
64 Id.
65 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 108.
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ply these legal principles to the facts of the case.66
The Commission reiterates some principles ingrained in the
jurisprudence of the system, namely, that the rights to equality and
non-discrimination are central to the Inter-American human rights
system; that they entail obligations erga omnes67 of protection that
bind all states and generate effects with respect to third parties;
and the connection between the principles of equality and non-
discrimination.68
In its reasoning, the Commission also offers its view of the dif-
ferent “conceptions” of the principles of equality and non-discrimi-
nation.69 One conception is predicated in the prohibition against
any form of “arbitrary difference in treatment”—defined as any dis-
tinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference.70 A second concep-
tion is premised on the obligation to “ensure conditions of true
equality for groups which have been historically excluded, and are
at greater risk of discrimination.”71 The Commission considers that
even though both variants may be at issue in certain cases, each of
them “warrants a different response from the State, and a different
treatment under the American Convention.”72
There are other groundbreaking elements to the Commis-
sion’s analysis. The Commission innovatively finds that sexual
orientation is covered by the phrase “other social condition” con-
tained in article 1.1.73 The Commission interprets article 1.1 as an
open clause in accordance with current times and evolving social
conditions and follows the precedent of other international bod-
ies—such as the European Court, the Human Rights Committee,
and the Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Committee—in the
flexible interpretation of the non-discrimination clause contained
in major human rights treaties.74
The Commission goes further and also concludes that sexual
66 Id. ¶ 74–108.
67 The Commission refers in particular to an advisory opinion titled Juridical Condi-
tion and Rights of Undocumented Migrants. Id. ¶ 74; Juridical Condition and Rights of
Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion, OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. A)
No. 18, ¶ 173(5) (Sept. 17, 2003) (“That the fundamental principle . . .  of equality
and non-discrimination, which is of a preemptory nature entails obligations erga omnes
of protection that bind all States and generate effects with regard to parties, including
individuals.”).
68 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 77.




73 Id. ¶ 94.
74 Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 95.
348 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:335
orientation is a “suspect category” of discrimination, subject to a
particularly rigorous standard of review, or “strict scrutiny.”75 In
this regard, the Commission begins its analysis by stating that this
rigorous standard is applicable to categories that are expressly ref-
erenced in the non-discrimination clauses contained in interna-
tional human rights treaties.76 These expressly referenced grounds
are considered “suspect,” and, therefore, potentially based on the
prejudices and stereotypes that underlie discrimination,77 the ap-
plication of this “strict standard of review” shifts the burden of
proof to the state, and demands that very “weighty reasons” are
presented to justify a given distinction.78 Even though not expressly
referenced in article 1.1, the Commission also applies the strict
scrutiny standard to “sexual orientation” as a prohibited ground of
discrimination—including homosexuality, its expression, and its
necessary consequences on a person’s life plans.79 It does this fol-
lowing the precedent issued by the European Court of Human
Rights, among other international bodies.80
Applying this analysis to the facts of the case, the Commission
made some key findings.   It first established that the decision of
the Chilean Supreme Court was based on Karen Atala’s sexual ori-
entation, despite the State’s arguments.81 The State had main-
tained that the Supreme Court’s decision was not based on Karen
Atala’s sexual orientation, but on her cohabitation with a partner
of the same sex, and the effect that situation could have on M., V.,
and R.82 The Commission instead found that the decision was
based on Karen Atala’s expression of her sexual orientation as dis-
played by the language used by the Supreme Court of Chile.83 The
Supreme Court had referred explicitly in the judgment to “the ab-
sence of a male parent in the home,” and the impact it could have
on the girls’ “mental and emotional wellbeing”; the “exceptional
family environment of M., V., and R.,” different from that “of their
75 Id. ¶ 94.
76 The Commission describes this more standard test as involving several elements,
including: a) the existence of a legitimate goal, the suitability or logical means–to-end
relationship between the goal sought and the distinction; b) the existence of other
alternatives; and c) proportionality—understood as a balance among the interests in-
volved, and the level of sacrifice demanded from one party in comparison to the level
of benefit to the other. See id. ¶ 86.
77 Id. ¶ 88.
78 Id. ¶ 89.
79 Id. ¶ 96.
80 Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 92.
81 See id. ¶ 96.
82 See id.
83 See id. ¶¶ 97–98.
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schoolmates and neighborhood acquaintances, exposing them to
the risk of isolation and discrimination”; and the consideration
that Karen Atala had “placed her freedom to express her homosex-
uality above the girls’ right to grow up in a normally structured and
socially accepted family in accordance with the corresponding
traditional model.”84
Secondly, the Commission—applying the strict scrutiny stan-
dard—considered that the State had a legitimate end in its actions
by aiming to protect the interest of Karen Atala’s daughters by
means of the custody decision.85 It did not find, however, that the
decision met the “suitability” requirement, since there was no evi-
dence indicating that Karen Atala’s sexual orientation—or the ex-
pression of it in her life plans—posed a treat to her daughters.86
Therefore, the Commission found that the Supreme Court based
its decision on assumptions of risk grounded on prejudices and ste-
reotypes regarding the characteristics and behavior of a given so-
cial group.87 In conclusion, the Commission deemed other aspects
of the test irrelevant to the decision.88
b. The Right to a Private Life of Karen Atala (Article 11.2 of the
American Convention)
The Commission also established in its merits report that the
State—by means of a custody decision rooted in prejudices based
on sexual orientation—violated the right of Karen Atala to live free
from abusive and arbitrary interferences in her private life, a right
protected under article 11(2) of the American Convention.89
Among its findings, and based on European Court precedent, the
Commission highlighted that sexual orientation is a fundamental
component of the private life of an individual, which should be
free from arbitrary and abusive interferences by the state in the
absence of weighty and convincing reasons.90
84 See id. ¶ 98.
85 Id. ¶ 99.
86 Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 103.
87 See id.
88 Id. ¶ 105.
89 Id. ¶ 117.
90 See id. ¶ 113 (“There is a clear nexus between the sexual orientation and the
development of the identity and life plan of an individual, including his or her per-
sonality, and relations with other human beings,” referencing E. B. v. France, App.
No. 43546/02 ¶ 91 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008); Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, App.
Nos. 33985/96 & 33986/96 ¶ 89 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999); Lustig-Prean and Beckett v.
United Kingdom, App. Nos. 31417/96 & 32377/96 ¶ 82 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999); Karner
v. Austria, App. No. 40016/98 ¶ 37 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003).
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In regard to the specific facts of this case, the Commission
considered that while it may be necessary for judicial authorities in
the framework of a custody proceeding to review aspects of a per-
son’s private life, a person’s sexual orientation, on its own, is not a
relevant criterion to determining a person’s capacity to exercise
custody over his or her children.91 Therefore, in this particular
case, the Commission held that the State’s interference in the pri-
vate life of Karen Atala was arbitrary, since the custody decision was
based on discriminatory prejudices predicated on her sexual orien-
tation, and not in an objective assessment of each of the parents’
capacity to exercise custody of their daughters.92
c. The Right to Private and Family Life of Karen Atala and her
Daughters (Articles 11.2 and 17.1 of the American
Convention)
The Commission in its merits report established a connection
between an individual’s right to a private life with his or her right
to protection of the family protected under article 17.1 of the
American Convention.93 The right to protection of the family un-
derscores the central role of the family in a person’s existence and
life plans.94 The Commission also held that the right to a private
and family life extends to the development of relations between
family members and the role of emotional relations in the life pro-
ject of each of its members.95
In this particular case, the Commission held that a family com-
prising Karen Atala and her daughters was established in March of
2002, and after this arrangement was agreed-upon, the girls’ father
filed suit to secure custody for himself.96 Therefore, the Commis-
sion held that the judgment denied the girls the opportunity to
grow up alongside their mother. It also denied their mother the
possibility of contributing to their development and upbringing,
thereby altering their family life plans in a dramatic and irrepara-
ble fashion.97 Thus, the Commission appealed to the Court to find
that the State of Chile interfered arbitrarily and abusively in the
family life of Karen Atala and M., V., and R. in violation of articles
11.2 and 17.1 of the American Convention, in conjunction with the
91 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 114.
92 Id. ¶ 115.
93 Id. ¶ 118.
94 Id.
95 Id. ¶ 122.
96 Id. ¶ 120.
97 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 121.
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obligation contained in article 1.1 thereof, by means of amending
the custody regime solely on the basis of discriminatory prejudices
regarding Karen Atala’s sexual orientation.98
d. The Rights of the Child and the Equal Rights of Spouses
Following the Dissolution of a Marriage (Articles 19 and
17.4 of the American Convention)
The Commission’s ruling advances important standards re-
lated to the rights of the child, along with the rights of spouses vis-
à-vis their children after a marriage is dissolved.99 The ruling reiter-
ates the duty of states under article 19 of the American Convention
to offer special protection to children—an obligation particularly
important in cases where parents separate.100 It also underscores
the importance under article 17.4 of adopting special protection
measures for children when their parents dissolve their marriage
and of safeguarding the right of each parent to participate in the
upbringing of their children free from any form of discrimination,
as a key to furthering the best interests of the children involved.101
The Commission also highlights several rights of children that
are protected under the Convention on the Rights of the Child
during legal proceedings that could end in their separation from
their parents.102 It underscores foremost the obligation of State
parties to hear the opinions of children in judicial processes that
directly affect them.103
In light of these standards, the Commission held that the cus-
tody decision handed down by the Supreme Court of Justice of
Chile did not advance the best interests of M., V., and R. by separat-
ing them “arbitrarily, permanently, and irreparably” from their
mother in the absence of clear evidence of harm to their wel-
fare.104 The Commission considered that the decision also stigma-
tized the girls “for having a homosexual mother and for living in a
family not accepted by general Chilean society, thus embracing
and legitimizing the prejudices and stereotypes toward homosex-
ual couples and children raised by such couples,” which were ad-
vanced by the father’s custody suit.105 In this context, the
98 Id. ¶ 123.
99 See id. ¶¶ 126–127.
100 Id. ¶ 126.
101 Id. ¶ 127.
102 Id. ¶¶ 129–130.
103 Atala, Application, supra note 27.
104 Id. ¶ 131.
105 Id.
352 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:335
Commission considered particularly serious that the Supreme
Court failed to take into account the girls’ preferences and needs
during the custody proceedings, in contrast to what occurred in
lower courts.106 The Commission underscores that:
. . . the girls’ best interests cannot be used by the State as a pre-
text to discriminate against a specific group of people, and that
removing children from their home environment must be an
exceptional measure, on account of the irreparable damage it
can cause to the structure of the family and their life plans.107
In the end, the Commission stated that the girls were entitled
to a justice system that would look out for their interests during all
stages of the proceedings by considering their opinion and by in-
vestigating and assessing the capacity of both parents to care for
them—an objective analysis that did not take place in the custody
proceeding at issue.108
e. Right to a Fair Trial and to Judicial Protection (Articles 8.1
and 25 of the American convention)
The Commission in its ruling also established a link between
the guarantee of impartiality that must permeate all judicial pro-
ceedings under article 8.1 of the American Convention and the use
of discriminatory prejudices to ground a legal decision.109 The
Commission reiterated that the guarantee of impartiality demands
that the judge acting within the framework of a legal process ap-
proach the facts “of the case subjectively free of all prejudice and
also offer sufficient objective guarantees to exclude any doubt the
parties or the community might entertain as to his or her lack of
impartiality.”110 The Commission noted that the proceedings en-
compassed a series of prejudices and discriminatory stereotypes ad-
vanced by Ms. Atala’s former husband in his suit, later reflected in
the provisional custody judgment issued by the Regular Judge of
the Juvenile Court in Villarica on May 2, 2003, and then in the
judgment issued by the Supreme Court of Justice of Chile.111
3. Recommendations to the State
Based on the considerations outlined above, the Commission
found the State of Chile responsible for the violation of the rights
106 Id. ¶ 132.
107 Id. ¶ 135.
108 Id. ¶ 133.
109 Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶¶ 137–150.
110 Id. ¶ 141.
111 Id. ¶ 143.
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to equality and non-discrimination; private and family life; to pro-
tection of the family; to the special protection of girls; to the equal
balancing of rights between the spouses; and to judicial guarantees
and protection, established in articles 8.1, 11.2, 17.1, 17.4, 19, 24,
and 25.1 of the American Convention, in relation to the general
obligation not to discriminate contained in article 1.1 of said
instrument.112
In its report No. 139/09,113 the IACHR recommended that the
Chilean State:
1. Provide Karen Atala and M., V., and R. with comprehensive
redress for the human rights violations that arose from the
decision to withdraw her custody on the basis of her sexual
orientation, taking into consideration their situation and
needs; and
2. Adopt legislation, public policies, programs, and directives to
prohibit and eradicate discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation from all spheres of public power, including the
administration of justice. These measures must be accompa-
nied by adequate human and financial resources to guaran-
tee their implementation, as well as training programs for the
public officials involved in upholding those rights.
4. Process After Merits Report
In this case, the Commission gave the State of Chile several
months to undertake steps to comply with the recommendations
issued by the Commission.114 After noting the absence of substan-
tive progress in the implementation of its recommendations, the
Commission decided to present this case to the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights for its contentious review on September
17, 2010.115
a. Processing of the Case Before the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights
The processing of the case of Karen Atala and Daughters before
the Court included analysis of extensive documentation and infor-
mation submitted by the representatives, the State, and the Com-
mission;116 the presentation of a significant number of amicus
112 Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 23.
113 Id. ¶ 24.
114 Id. ¶¶ 25–29.
115 Id. ¶ 39.
116 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶¶ 7–11 (Feb. 24, 2012).
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briefs;117 and the convening of a public hearing on August 23rd
and 24th of 2011.118 The Court also undertook a judicial diligence,
visiting Chile to interview Karen Atala’s daughters to gather their
observations in relation to the case.119
The Court issued its final judgment on February 24, 2012. In
its judgment, the Court found a number of violations under the
American Convention to the detriment of Karen Atala and M., V.,
and R. echoing a significant part of the Commission’s analysis
presented before the Court, but also adding new elements related
to the content of the obligations not to discriminate, to guarantee
equality, the rights of the child, and the rights to a private and
family life, to be discussed in more detail in the following
section.120
More concretely, in its judgment, the Court found that the
State of Chile was responsible for the violations to the rights to
equality and the obligation not to discriminate contained in Article
24 of the American Convention, in relation to the obligation to
respect and guarantee provided for in article 1.1 of the same in-
strument, to the prejudice of Karen Atala.121 It also found viola-
tions for the same articles, in relation to the rights of the child
contained in article 19 of the American Convention, to the detri-
ment of M., V., and R., as well as their right to be heard, provided
for in article 8.1 of the same instrument.122 The Court also found a
violation of the rights of Karen Atala to a private life and to the
guarantee of impartiality contained in the American Convention in
regard to the disciplinary investigation undertaken against her.123
Lastly, the Court found violations to the rights to private life and
protection of the family—contained in articles 11.2 and 17.1 of the
American Convention—to the prejudice of Karen Atala and M., V.,
and R.124
117 Id. ¶ 10.
118 Id. ¶ 7.
119 Id. ¶¶ 12–13, 67–71.
120 Id. ¶¶ 72–k, 238.
121 Id. ¶ 314(1).
122 Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶
314(2), (5).
123 Id. ¶ 314(6).
124 Id. ¶ 314(4).
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III. THE CASE OF KAREN ATALA AND DAUGHTERS AND ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO LEGAL STANDARDS RELATED TO
DISCRIMINATION, EQUALITY, AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS
The Author suggests in this Article that the Commission and
Court’s decisions in the case of Karen Atala and Daughters make key
contributions to the development of legal standards related to the
content of the obligations not to discriminate, to guarantee equal-
ity, and to respect and ensure women’s rights. The potential legacy
of these judgments will be reviewed in five areas: 1) the scope and
reach of the obligations not to discriminate and to guarantee
equality under articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention; 2)
the features of the “rigorous scrutiny” standard of review of differ-
ent treatment based on prohibited factors of discrimination; 3) the
obligation not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender identity, and its applicability to individual cases related
to women; 4) the correlation of this prohibition with the rights to
privacy and to protection of the family under international human
rights law; and 5) the content of the bests interests of the child
under international human rights law.
In the analysis presented in this section, the Author considers
the cognizable trend in the international community to recognize
the multidisciplinary nature of gender equality issues.125  This ten-
dency includes the recognition of a continuum of legal obligations
of a negative and positive nature, threading a body of civil and po-
litical rights, with fundamental economic, social, and cultural
rights, positioning women as rights-holders.126 This web of rights
includes not only the right of women to live free from discrimina-
tion and violence, but also their right to privacy and protection of
the family; their right to be free from discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity; their rights as children
when applicable; and their entitlement to a diversity of judicial pro-
tections and guarantees in civil and criminal matters.127 Therefore,
the Commission and Court decisions in the case of Karen Atala and
125 See generally CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 28, supra note
5, ¶¶ 14-20; IACHR, The Work, Education, and Resources of Women, supra note 9.
126 See CEDAW Convention, supra note 2, Introduction.
127 See id., arts. 1, 2, 16; CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 19,
Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc A/47/38 (Jan. 29, 1992) [hereinafter CEDAW
Committee, General Recommendation No. 19]; CEDAW Committee, General Recom-
mendation No. 12, Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc A/44/38 (1989) [hereinafter
CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 12]; CEDAW Committee, Gen-
eral Recommendation No. 21, Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, U.N. Doc
A/49/38 (Feb. 4, 1994) [hereinafter CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation
No. 21].
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Daughters—and their potential legacy—should be studied and ex-
amined together, considering the comprehensive nature of the
aforementioned body of human rights involved in the full respect
and guarantee of women’s human rights.
A. The Contours of the Obligations Not to Discriminate and to
Guarantee Equality under the American Convention: The
Implicit Content of “Other Social Condition”
There are several noteworthy elements in the Inter-American
Court’s analysis of the reach of the obligations not to discriminate
and to guarantee equality under articles 1.1 and 24 of the Ameri-
can Convention in the Karen Atala and Daughters judgment. The
Court solidifies some of the principles advanced by the Commis-
sion in its merits ruling reiterates, some of its legal precedent re-
lated to discrimination and equality, and pushes the boundary of
these standards by presenting some ground breaking features re-
lated to sexual orientation, gender identity, and the response of
state authorites to social prejudice and stereotypes.
Of utmost significance, is that the Court—as the Commission
had done in its merits report—finds that sexual orientation is a
prohibited factor of discrimination under article 1.1 of the Ameri-
can Convention, even though this factor is not explicitly included
in the enumerated grounds.128
It should be noted also that the Court advances a broad read-
ing of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, not only
limited to the exercise of homosexuality, but also its expression
and the necessary consequences of the same in the life project of
persons, reaffirming the analysis advanced in the Commission’s
ruling.129 In this way, the Court follows previous cases issued by the
European Court of Human Rights alluding not only to sexual ori-
entation, but its exercise, as a relevant aspect of the private life of
an individual.130
The Court’s ruling has broad implications for human rights
throughout the Americas, as it means that all of the rights pro-
128 Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 91;
Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 95; American Convention, supra note 3, art. 1.1
(“The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free
and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons
of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.”).
129 Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 133.
130 See id.
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tected under the American Convention should be ensured in a
non-discriminatory manner in regard to a person’s sexual orienta-
tion, and the expression and the design of a life plan based on
sexual orientation. The Court makes very clear that the Conven-
tion prohibits any norms, acts, or discriminatory practices based on
the sexual orientation of a person, and no norm, decision, or inter-
nal law practice—performed by either states or individuals—can
restrict the rights of a person on the basis of his or her sexual ori-
entation in any way.131
But the Court also extends this recognition to gender identity,
which opens a very important avenue for transgender and transsex-
ual persons, and other marginalized groups, to bring their cases
before the Inter-American system.132 This is a very bold move by
the Court since the facts before it in Karen Atala and Daughters cen-
tered mainly on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
as opposed to gender identity discrimination.133 The statement of
the Court pertaining to gender identity seems less enunciative, and
it remains to be seen how the Court will address the differences
and particularities of discrimination on the basis of gender identity
in future cases.134
To offer an open interpretation to the non-discrimination
clause contained in article 1.1, the Court also presents a nuanced
analysis of the practice from international and regional protection
bodies to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion.135 It also treats the American Convention as a “living instru-
ment,”136 the application of which should respond to the evolution
of times and current life conditions137 and should follow the princi-
131 Id. ¶ 91.
132 Id. See also Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, The Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the Appli-
cation of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity, 6 n.2 (2007), available at http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.
pdf (“‘Gender Identity’ has been defined as “each person’s deeply felt internal and
individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex as-
signed at birth, including the personal sense of the body (which may involve, if freely
chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical or other
means) and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms.”).
See also U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Discriminatory Laws and Practices and
Acts of Violence Against Individuals Based on their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,
HRC Council, 19th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/41 (Nov. 17, 2011) (discussing prior-
ity concerns of persons based on their gender identity).
133 See Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶¶
16–58.
134 Id. ¶ 91.
135 Id. ¶¶ 87–88.
136 Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 83.
137 Id. ¶ 85.
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ple of the norm most favorable to the human person.138 This judg-
ment seems to continue the practice reflected in the Court’s Cotton
Field Judgment of referring in detail to pronouncements issued by
international, regional, and national bodies and institutions as an
important reference in its development of innovative legal stan-
dards related to gender equality issues.139
Even though the Court does refer to international tendencies
related to sexual orientation, it seems to establish a difference be-
tween what it considers a tendency and a consensus-based argu-
ment that could be used as a pretext to discriminate.140 The Court
explicitly notes its rejection of arguments advanced by the State of
Chile pointing to the lack of consensus inside some countries in
the Americas as to the rights of sexual minorities, finding this argu-
ment invalid.141 It is interesting to draw a comparison between the
approach of the Inter-American Court and the mixed use by the
European Court of Human Rights of the issue of consensus, and
the margin of appreciation European States should have in this
area.142 The European Court has interpreted this margin of appre-
ciation in diferente ways—at times broadly and at other times nar-
rowly, depending on the issue examined.143
It is worth mentioning as well that in its review of discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation, the Court also combines
both classic and innovative elements in its analysis of the general
content of the obligation not to discriminate.144
In this regard, referring to its former precedent, it clarifies
138 See id. ¶ 84.
139 See González v. Mexico (Cotton Field), Preliminary Objection, Merits, Repara-
tions, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶¶ 113–136,
147–164, 249–286 (Nov. 16, 2009).
140 Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 92.
The Court however does refer to the four OAS General Assembly resolutions related
to sexual orientation and gender identity issued by the same entity since 2008. See id.
¶ 86. These resolutions have notably evolved over time from using violence-based
language in regard to state obligations, to a more discrimination and gender equality-
oriented mandate. OAS, Resolutions on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gen-
der Identity, AG/RES. 2435 (XXXVIII-O/O8), AG/RES. 2504 (XXXIX-O/O9), AG/
RES. 2600 (XL-O/10), AG/RES. 2653 (XLI-O/11).
141 Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 92.
142 See, e.g., Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, ¶¶ 49–64 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
2010); Goodwin v. United Kindgom, App. No. 28957/95, ¶¶ 71-93 (Eu. Ct. H.R.
2002); Karner v. Austria, App. No. 40016/98, ¶¶ 29–43 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003); Smith
and Grady v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, ¶¶ 69–112 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1999).
143 See cases cited supra note 142.
144 See Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶
78–82.
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that article 1.1 of the American Convention is a norm of a general
nature whose content extends to all the dispositions in the treaty,
which means that any treatment which can be considered discrimi-
natory in respect to any of the rights guaranteed therein is per se
incompatible with the same.145 States should abstain from perform-
ing actions that in any way either directly or indirectly create de
facto or de jure situations of discrimination, and states are obligated
to adopt positive measures to address situations of discrimination
existing in their societies, to the prejudice of a determined group
of persons.146 This involves a special duty of protection that a state
should exercise with respect to the actions and practices of third
parties, that under its tolerance and acquiescence, create, main-
tain, or favor discriminatory situations.147
The Court, however, does maintain a somewhat strict distinc-
tion between the contents of articles 1.1 and 24 of the American
Convention—a precedent set in its case Apitz Barbera and Others—
while the Commission advances a somewhat organic view of the
relationship between both articles.148 In its earlier jurisprudence,
145 Id. ¶ 78.
146 Id. ¶ 80.
147 Id.
148 As noted by the Author previously, the Court continues to underscore the dis-
tinction between the obligations contained in articles 1.1 and 24 of the American
Convention, holding in the case of Apitz Barbera v. Venezuela:
The difference between the two articles lies in that the general obliga-
tion contained in Article 1.1 refers to the State’s duty to respect and
guarantee “nondiscrimination” in the enjoyment of the rights en-
shrined in the American Convention, while Article 24 protects the right
to “equal treatment before the law.” In other words, if the State discrim-
inates upon the enforcement of conventional rights containing no sepa-
rate nondiscrimination clause a violation of Article 1.1 and the
substantial right involved would arise. If, on the contrary, discrimination
refers to unequal protection by domestic law, a violation of Article 24
would occur.
See Apitz-Barbera v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 182, ¶ 209 (Aug. 5, 2008). This position
was reiterated by the Court in the judgments of Fernández-Ortega and Rosendo-Cantú. By
contrast, the Commission in Atala established that:
The development of the right to equal treatment and nondiscrimina-
tion points to the existence of several conceptions of it.  For example,
one conception is related to the prohibition of arbitrarily different
treatment—with different treatment understood as meaning distinc-
tion, exclusion, restriction, or preference—and another is related to the
obligation of ensuring conditions of true equality for groups that have
historically been excluded and are at greater risk of discrimination. Al-
though both views may be present in certain cases, each warrants a dif-
ferent response from the State and a different treatment under the
American Convention. To this must be added the fact that under the
different conceptions of the right of equality, a State’s actions and fail-
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the Court had advanced a more interrelated link between these
two articles.149
The Author notes overall that the open interpretation of the
non-discrimination clause by both the Commission and the Court
decisions is a paramount gain for legal standards related to dis-
crimination in the realm of the Inter-American system, as well as
for sectors and communities particularly exposed to this human
rights violation, such as women.150 A flexible interpretation of arti-
ures to act may be related to rights enshrined in the American Conven-
tion or they may be related to any undertaking of the State that does
not affect the enjoyment of Convention-protected rights. Therefore, al-
though certain criteria can be used as a basis, the applicable Conven-
tion provisions must be determined in each specific case by means of an
analysis that takes into account the individual or group of people af-
fected; the reasons behind the alleged discrimination; the rights or in-
terests involved; the actions or omissions that gave rise to it; as well as
other considerations.
Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶¶ 80–81. See also Celorio, The Rights of Women in the
Inter-American System of Human Rights, supra note 20, at 861 n.229.
149 See, e.g., Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advi-
sory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶ 85 (Sept. 17, 2003).
150 For example, the CESCR Committee has stated the following in regard to the
open interpretation of the non-discrimination clause contained in article 2(2) of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights:
The nature of discrimination varies according to context and evolves
over time. A flexible approach to the ground of “other status” is thus
needed in order to capture other forms of differential treatment that
cannot be reasonably and objectively justified and are of a comparable
nature to the expressly recognized grounds in article 2, paragraph 2.
These additional grounds are commonly recognized when they reflect
the experience of social groups that are vulnerable and have suffered
and continue to suffer marginalization. The Committee’s general com-
ments and concluding observations have recognized various other
grounds and these are described in more detail below. However, this list
is not intended to be exhaustive. Other possible prohibited grounds
could include the denial of a person’s legal capacity because he or she is
in prison, or is involuntarily interned in a psychiatric institution, or the
intersection of two prohibited grounds of discrimination, e.g. where ac-
cess to a social service is denied on the basis of sex and disability.
CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 20, supra note 1, ¶ 27.
 The CEDAW Committee has also pronounced over the issue of “intersectional-
ity” and the need for states to identity the factors that can combine with sex to foster
discrimination against women:
Intersectionality is a basic concept for understanding the scope of the
general obligations of States parties contained in article 2. The discrimi-
nation of women based on sex and gender is inextricably linked with
other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, religion or be-
lief , health, status, age, class, caste, and sexual orientation and gender
identity. Discrimination on the basis of sex or gender may affect women
belonging to such groups to a different degree or in different ways than
men. States parties must legally recognize and prohibit such intersect-
ing forms of discrimination and their compounded negative impact on
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cle 1.1 of the American Convention creates a space favorable to the
recognition of new forms of discrimination affecting women, as
well as other groups which may not yet be recognized by the inter-
national community, or that may be in an incipient stage of
recognition.
For example, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights has identified a number of “implied grounds” it con-
siders contained in the clause “other status” within the Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,151 aside from the “ex-
press grounds”152 already enumerated in that clause. The Commit-
tee identifies “implied grounds” to include: disability, age, marital
and family status, health status, place of residence, and the eco-
nomic and social situation of an individual153—all grounds that
have been used to discriminate against women historically.154
Offering an open interpretation to the prohibition of discrimi-
nation is also a key component to understanding the concept of
intersectionality in this context, meaning the multiple forms of dis-
crimination a woman may face based on a range of factors com-
bined with her sex.155  Discrimination against women rarely
happens in isolation and is often compounded by other factors,
such as sexual orientation, gender identity, age, race, and eco-
nomic status, among others.156 As stated by the Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights, this “cumulative discrimination
has a unique and specific impact on individuals and merits particu-
the women concerned. They also need to adopt and pursue policies and
programmes designed to eliminate such occurrences, including, where
appropriate, temporary special measures in accordance with article 4,
paragraph 1, of the Convention and General Recommendation No. 25.
CEDAW (Committee), General Recommendation No. 28, supra note 5, ¶ 18.
151 The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that
the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without
discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.
CESCR (Convention), supra note 2, art. 2(2).
152 The Committee has identified among the “express grounds”: discrimination on
the basis of race and color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property and birth. See CESCR (Committee), General Comment No.
20, supra note 1, ¶¶ 19–26.
153 See id. ¶¶ 27–35.
154 See e.g., CEDAW (Committee), General Recommendation No. 28, supra note 5, ¶
18; HRC (Committee), General Comment No. 18, supra note 1; THE WORLD BANK,
WORLD DEVELOMENT REPORT 2012, supra note 10, at 13–22.
155 See CEDAW (Committee), General Recommendation No. 28, supra note 5, ¶ 18.
156 See id. ¶ 18.
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lar consideration and remedying.”157 For example, a vast amount
of persons who suffer discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion are also women of different ages, races, ethnicities, and socio-
economic groups.158 Lesbian and transgender women, moreover,
face an acute risk to human rights violations due to prevailing gen-
der inequality and its effect on family relations and social
dynamics.159
The current international human rights law system needs to
be responsive to the experience of marginalization that certain
groups of the population face, and an open interpretation of the
non-discrimination clause contained in human rights treaties is
fundamental to this goal.160 The Author also believes in the need
to interpret the instruments of the Inter-American and universal
systems of human rights as “living” documents, in light of the cur-
rent times and emerging forms of discrimination, and taking into
account the evolving nature of the international human rights law
system, its values, and standards.161 The Commission and Court’s
decisions in the case of Karen Atala and Daughters show how interna-
tional, regional, and national precedent can be combined and in-
terpreted in ways that offer the most protection to groups and
sectors who have historically suffered, and continue to bear, alarm-
ing forms of discrimination.
B. The Features of Rigorous Scrutiny Analysis: The Legal Examination
of Different Treatment on the Basis of Prohibited Factors of
Discrimination
The Inter-American Court also innovatively found that distinc-
tions based on sexual orientation should be subjected to rigorous
scrutiny.162 This entails a shift in the burden of proof, requiring
from the state the presentation of very weighty reasons to justify
157 CESCR (Committee), General Comment No. 20, supra note 1, ¶ 17.
158 U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts
of Violence Against Individuals Based on their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, HRC
(Council), 19th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/41 ¶¶ 21, 29, 63, 67 (Nov. 17, 2011).
159 Id. ¶ 21.
160 See, e.g., CESCR (Committee), General Comment No. 20, supra note 1, ¶¶
15–35.
161 For more analysis on this principle, see The Right to Information on Consular
Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory
Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, ¶ 114 (Oct. 1, 1999); Interpre-
tation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the
Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory
Opinion OC 10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶ 37 (Jul. 14, 1989).
162 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 124 (Feb. 24, 2012).
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that the decision at issue did not have a discriminatory objective or
effect, following precedent from the European Court of Human
Rights, including the well-known case of Karner v. Austria.163
In applying this rigorous standard of scrutiny, the Court ad-
vances important principles that the Author considers may have
long-lasting effects in the examination of potential allegations of
bias, mistreatment, and prejudice contained in a judicial pro-
cess.164 This analysis can be particularly useful for the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission, due to its historical application of the “fourth
instance doctrine” and the fact that as a matter of practice the
Commission does not review cases where the main allegations are
centered on errors of fact and law incurred by domestic tribu-
nals.165 This is a tricky doctrine to apply in cases like Karen Atala
and Daughters, since it is very challenging to examine whether dis-
crimination has been present in a judicial process without review-
ing the main judicial actions and the processing of the case by
domestic courts.
Firstly, the Court established that to determine whether a dif-
ference of treatment has been applied by means of a particular
legal decision, it is not necessary that the entire decision be based
on the sexual orientation of a person.166 Applying the precedent
set in the European Court judgment of E.B. v. France, the Inter-
American Court considered it sufficient that sexual orientation was
considered either explicitly or implicitly in the adoption of a spe-
cific legal decision.167 In this regard, the Court advances a “nexus”
test, where it analyzes whether there was a link—either causal or
decisive—between the sexual orientation of Karen Atala and the
decisions issued by the Supreme Court of Chile and the Juvenile
Court of Villarica.168 To determine the existence of this nexus, the
163 Id. ¶ 124, n.143 (referring to cases from the European Court of Human Rights,
Karner v. Austria, App. No. 40016/98, ¶ 37 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003) and Kozak v. Poland,
App. No. 13102/02, ¶ 92 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010)).
164 Id. ¶¶ 100–146. These principles could potentially be applied in cases before
the Inter-American Commission that allege the influence of prejudice and stereotypes
in the resolution of a judicial process concerning violence against women issues. See,
e.g., Nunes da Silva v. Brazil, Petition 337-03, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 93/
09, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 51 (2009); Loaiza López Soto v. Venezuela, Petition 1462-
07, Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., Report No. 154/10, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 5, rev. 1
(2011).
165 For a detailed analysis of the fourth instance doctrine, see Santiago Marzioni v.
Argentina, Case 11.673, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 39/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/
II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶¶ 48–51 (1997). See also Atala, Petition, supra note 29, ¶¶ 59–60.
166 Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 94.
167 Id.
168 Id. ¶ 95.
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Court enumerates a few factors that must be reviewed, including
the arguments advanced by the national judicial authorities, their
conduct, the language used, and the context in which the judicial
decisions were produced.169 Reviewing thoroughly a series of judi-
cial actions in this case, including the reasoning presented in the
custody complaint filed by the father of M., V., and R.; the reason-
ing advanced by the Supreme Court of Justice of Chile; and the
provisional custody decisions; the Court determined that the pro-
cess was centered around the sexual orientation of Karen Atala and
the presumed consequences that cohabitation with a same-sex part-
ner could produce on the three girls.170 Therefore, the Court con-
sidered that a difference in treatment had been made in the
context of the custody proceeding based on a prohibited factor of
discrimination contained in article 1.1 of the Convention.171
Then the Court proceeded to determine whether this differ-
ence in treatment was justified based on the justification presented
by the State of Chile, namely the best interest of the children in-
volved and the presumed harm that they would have suffered
founded on the sexual orientation of their mother.172 In this re-
gard, the Court affirms the legitimate and imperative nature of the
best interests of the child as an objective, as well as the special pro-
tection principle contained in article 19 of the American Conven-
tion and the dispositions of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child—what the Court has consistently referred to as the “corpus
juris” related to the rights of the child.173 The Court, however, clar-
ifies that the sole abstract reference to the best interests of the
child as a legitimate objective, without proving in a concrete fash-
ion the risks and harms which have been provoked by the sexual
orientation of the mother to her children, is insufficient to justify a
custody determination.174 A custody decision cannot be based on
stereotypical notions related to the capacity of either of the parents
to exercise their care-taking role.175
Using this foundation as a basis, the Court proceeds to analyze
four of the main arguments advanced by the Supreme Court re-
lated to the potential impact of same-sex cohabitation on the girls
involved, and whether these arguments furthered their best inter-
169 Id.
170 Id. ¶¶ 96–98.
171 Id.
172 Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 99.
173 Id. ¶ 108.
174 Id. ¶ 109.
175 Id. ¶ 111.
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ests.176 In regard to the “presumed social discrimination” allegedly
suffered by the girls due to their mother’s cohabitation with a
same-sex partner, the Court considers this an illegitimate founda-
tion for a custody decision, as intolerance cannot be used a pretext
to further discrimination.177 The Court establishes that the law
should aim to advance society and not legitimize different forms of
discrimination in violation of human rights.178 As to the potential
“confusion of roles,” the Court concluded that the Supreme Court
of Chile did not present weighty reasons showing that the sexual
orientation of Karen Atala and her cohabitation with a partner of
the same-sex did have a negative impact on the psychological and
emotional well being, the sexual orientation, and the social rela-
tions of the girls.179 The Court also rejected the Supreme Court
argument that Karen Atala had privileged her interests above those
of her daughters in cohabiting with a person of the same-sex, as it
was unreasonable to expect that she would sacrifice a crucial part
of her identity to retain custody of her daughters.180 The Court also
considered arguments advancing a traditional or normal family
model to be inadequate, as it did not deem that the American Con-
vention advances such a model.181
Therefore, the Court considered that even though the Su-
preme Court and Villarica Juvenile Court’s decisions sought to fur-
ther the protection of the best interests of the children, it was not
proven that the reasoning contained in these judgments was ade-
quate to further that goal.182  It considered instead that these deci-
sions were based on “abstract, stereotyped and discriminatory
arguments,” in violation of article 24 of the American Convention,
in relation to article 1.1 of the same instrument.183
The Author however hopes that the Court will delve in greater
detail into the elements that compose the application of the “rigor-
ous scrutiny standard,” and what would be the determining criteria
to apply this standard to certain factors of discrimination either
explicitly or implicitly contained in article 1.1 of the American
Convention.184
176 Id. ¶ 113.
177 Id. ¶ 119.
178 Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 120.
179 Id. ¶ 130.
180 Id. ¶ 139.
181 Id. ¶ 142.
182 Id. ¶ 146.
183 Id.
184 Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 87.
The Court does refer to Clift v. United Kingdom, decided by the European Court of
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For example, the Author is interested in seeing whether the
aforementioned analysis of the Court is reconciled with the Com-
mission’s more nuanced review of the strict scrutiny standard in its
merits report.185 The Commission in its merits decision on the case
of Karen Atala and Daughters refers to a “strict scrutiny” standard of
review and delves in more detail into the elements that should
guide this analysis.186 At its core, the Commission is pondering
whether these distinctions are “objective and reasonable” in light
of a state’s advanced aim, and the burden of proof falls on a state
involved to present “weighty reasons” to justify them.187
In the past, the Commission has referred to the elements of
this rigorous test, highlighting in particular that a distinction based
on reasonable and objective criteria: 1) pursues a legitimate aim;
and 2) employs means which are proportional to the end
sought.188 This test is similar to the one applied by the European
Court of Human Rights to factors it deems should be subject to a
more rigorous level of scrutiny.189
The Commission in its merits report goes further, however,
requiring the state to advance a pressing social need to justify the
distinction, and to also show that the distinction complied with the
elements of suitability, necessity, and proportionality.190 For the
Commission, it is not sufficient for a state to argue the existence of
a legitimate goal. Instead, the end sought must be particularly im-
portant or weighty.191  The measure must also be strictly necessary
to attain the goal, meaning that no other less harmful alternative
exists, and the measure must also be proportional to the end
sought, entailing an appropriate balance of interests in terms of
the levels of sacrifice and benefit.192 Therefore, the analysis of dif-
ferent treatment based on the sexual orientation of a person
Human Rights, in which the European Court reaffirms how categories included
under “other status”—protected under Article 14 of the European Convention—
often constitute personal characteristics of persons, in the sense that they tend to be
innate or inherent to the person involved. Id. ¶ 87 (citing Clift v. United Kingdom
App. No. 7205/07, ¶¶ 55–63 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010)).
185 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶¶ 85–108.
186 See id. ¶¶ 85–89.
187 See id.
188 See Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Re-
port No. 4/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 36 (2001).
189 See, e.g., Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, ¶ 29 (Eu. Ct.
H.R. 1999).
190 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶¶ 85–89, 101–108.
191 Id. ¶¶ 88–89.
192 Id.
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should be more rigorous.193
The Commission does conclude along with the Court that the
objective identified by the State of Chile to justify the custody deci-
sion—to advance the best interests of the child of M., V., and R.—
constitutes a pressing social need, but fails to find a logical causal
relationship between the accomplishment of this objective and the
custody decision.194 The Commission considered that the custody
decision was based on discriminatory prejudices, and not in an ob-
jective assessment of the parents’ capacity to exercise custody over
their daughters.195 Therefore, the Commission found that the deci-
sions in this case did not meet the suitability requirement, and the
Commission did not consider it necessary to refer to the other ele-
ments of the strict scrutiny test.196
In its merits report, the Commission also refers to sexual ori-
entation as a “suspect category” of distinction, meriting a strict
scrutiny analysis to ensure it is not grounded in prejudice.197 As
mentioned earlier, the Commission reaches this finding on the ba-
sis of previous cases ruled by international bodies and well-known
national Courts subjecting distinctions based on sexual orientation
to a particularly rigorous standard of review.198 The Court does not
use this terminology or employ this line of analysis in its
judgment.199
The Commission’s analysis is also useful in its presentation of
the elements assessed by different international bodies and na-
tional tribunals to consider that a prohibited ground to discrimi-
nate amounts to being “suspect.”200 Some of the factors weighed by
courts and bodies are: “immutability” (understood as a characteris-
193 Id. ¶ 86.
194 See id. ¶¶ 101–108.
195 See id. ¶ 105.
196 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶¶ 96–108.
197 See id. ¶¶ 90–95.
198 See id. ¶¶ 81–83 (citing S.L. v. Austria, App. No. 45330/99, ¶ 37 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
2003); E. B. v. France, App. No. 43546/02, ¶ 91 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008); Corte Constitu-
cional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 28, 2009, Sentencia, C-029/09, Gaceta de
la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitu-
tional Court], febrero 7, 2007, Sentencia, C-075/07, Gaceta de la Corte Constitu-
cional [G.C.C.] (Colom.); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court],
febrero 8, 2005, C-101/05, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.);
Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, 1998 (12) BCLR 1517
(CC) at 14–16 (S. Afr.); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated
en banc, 875 F.2d 699, 728 (9th Cir. 1989); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896
(Iowa 2009).
199 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 78–146 (Feb. 24, 2012).
200 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶¶ 85–89.
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tic that is difficult to control and that a person cannot change with-
out modifying his or her identity); the history of marginalization
and exclusion of a given group; and the manifest irrationality of
dividing social responsibilities on the basis of this factor.201 Al-
though not mentioned in the merits report, the limited political
participation of a given group has also been considered by national
courts as an element to determine whether a given discrimination
factor is “suspect.”202
The Commission itself has established in the past that distinc-
tions based on grounds expressly identified in article 1.1 of the
American Convention, such as sex and race, are subject to a partic-
ularly strict scrutiny,203 and reiterates this finding as a matter of
consensus in its merits report.204 Even though the European Court
does not refer to “suspect categories” per se, it has also applied a
particularly rigorous level of scrutiny to distinctions based on
grounds identified as as prohibited under article 14 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights.205
However, as more prohibited factors of discrimination are
identified by international courts—beyond those expressly identi-
fied in the non-discrimination clauses of human rights treaties—
more analysis will be needed as to whether these factors will auto-
matically become “suspect” as well, meriting a strict scrutiny analy-
sis.206 For example, it remains to be seen whether all of the express
and implied grounds recognized by the Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights under “other status” will also be consid-
201 Id. ¶ 94.
202 See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (dis-
cussing U.S. federal and state cases shedding light on this element).
203 See, e.g., IACHR, Access to Justice for Women Victims of Violence in the Ameri-
cas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 68, ¶¶ 80, 83 (Jan. 27, 2007); IACHR, Report on Terror-
ism and Human Rights, supra note 1, ¶ 338; Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case
11.625, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 4/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20 rev.
¶ 36 (2001); IACHR, Annual Report 1999: Considerations Regarding the Compatibil-
ity of Affirmative Action Measures Designed to Promote the Political Participation of
Women with the Principles of Equality and Non-Discrimination, OEA/Ser.L/V/
II.106, doc. 6 (Apr. 13, 1999).
204 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 88.
205 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 9214/80;
9473/81; 9474/81, ¶ 78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1985)(discussing sex); Hoffmann v. Austria,
App. No. 12875/87, ¶ 33–36 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1993)(discussing religion); Timishev v.
Russia, App. Nos. 55762/00 & 55974/00, ¶ 56 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005)(discussing race).
206 See, e.g., Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶¶ 85–96; Kiyutin v. Russia, App. No.
2700/10, ¶ 56 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011). See also Roberto P. Saba, Igualdad, Clases y Clasifi-
caciones:¿Qué es lo Sospechoso de las Categorı́as Sospechosas? [Equality, Classes, and Classifi-
cation: What is Suspect of the Suspect Categories?], in TEORÍA Y CRÍTICA DEL DERECHO
CONSTITUCIONAL (Roberto Gargarella, ed., 2008).
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ered suspect categories of discrimination by international legal
bodies.207
As indicated earlier, sexual orientation has many elements in
common with categories such as race and sex in terms of immuta-
bility—as a feature vital to a person’s identity—along with the his-
tory of marginalization that has affected this group, the irrational
division of responsibilities in a society based on this factor, and the
still-limited political participation of this community.208 However, is
it reasonable to compare “sexual orientation” with other implied
factors of discrimination identified by the Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights, such as economic situation,
place of residence, or marital status? Some of these factors might
not be considered “immutable,” while at the same time they have
undoubtedly been used historically to marginalize married and un-
married women in many rural and low-income zones, regions, and
countries.209 A challenge for international legal bodies is to iden-
tify which among this group of elements will be most preeminent
or relevant to determine whether a specific ground of discrimina-
tion reaches the “suspect” level.
The European Court of Human Rights has already afforded
some important analysis on this issue recently, and it will be inter-
esting to see how other regional tribunals—such as the Inter-Amer-
ican Court of Human Rights—approach this area in the future.210
In the case of Kiutyn v. Russia, the European Court recently ana-
lyzed whether the ground of “health status” could be considered as
included within the prohibited factors listed in article 14 of the
European Convention of Human Rights, and shared some impor-
tant analysis regarding the elements that render a discriminatory
ground subject to a especially rigorous level of scrutiny.211
In Kiuytin v. Russia, the applicant alleged that he had been the
victim of discrimination on account of his health status in his appli-
cation for a Russia residence permit.212 He was required to un-
dergo a medical examination during which he tested positive for
HIV, which resulted in the rejection of his application.213 The
207 CESCR (Committee), General Comment No. 20, supra note 2, ¶¶ 18–35.
208 See HRC Council Res. 17/19, Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender
Identity, 17th Sess., May 30–June 17, 2007, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1 ¶¶
48–73 (June 15, 2011).
209 See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOMENT REPORT 2012, supra note 10, at 20;
IACHR, The Work, Education, and Resources of Women, supra note 9, ¶¶ 309–312.
210 See Kiyutin, App. No. 2700/10.
211 Id. ¶ 56.
212 Id. ¶ 3.
213 Id. ¶ 9.
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Court considered the applicant’s claims under article 14 of the Eu-
ropean Convention, in conjunction with article 8.214  In its analysis
of whether the applicant’s health status fell under the “other sta-
tus” clause within the meaning of article 14, the Court reasoned
that the list of discriminatory factors set out in Article 14 is not
exhaustive and that this open interpretation has not been limited
to characteristics “which are personal in the sense that they are
innate or inherent.”215 Accordingly, the Court considered that a
distinction based on account of a person’s health status, including
conditions such as HIV infection, should be covered by the term
“other status” in the text of article 14 of the Convention.216 In its
application of a more rigorous standard of review, the Court
placed heavy emphasis on the marginalization that persons in-
fected with HIV have suffered historically.217
As stated by the European Court of Human Rights, the Author
proposes that the history of discrimination, marginalization, and
exclusion suffered by a given group of the population based on a
specific status is a factor of paramount importance in determining
whether certain distinctions should be considered “suspect” for ju-
dicial review purposes.218 Many of the prejudices and stereotypes
that underlie arbitrary distinctions are the product of this history,
and are fueled by social intolerance.219 This is particularly impor-
tant in the current context where a great deal of discrimination—
for example, against women—is indirect, or results from the dis-
criminatory impact of seemingly neutral policies.220
214 Id. ¶ 39.
215 Id. ¶ 56, citing Clift v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7205/07, ¶¶ 56–58 (Eu. Ct.
H.R. 2010)(considering it clear that while the court has consistently referred to the
need for a distinction based on a “personal” characteristic in order to engage Article
14, the protection conferred by that Article is not limited to different treatment based
on characteristics that are personal in the sense that they are innate or inherent.
Therefore, the European Court of Human Rights includes within “other status” the
different treatment of various categories of prisoners depending on the sentences
imposed.).
216 Kiyutin, App. No. 2700/10, ¶¶ 56–58.
217 Id. ¶ 64.
218 Id. ¶ 63.
219 For more analysis on this issue, see REBECCA J. COOK & SIMONE CUSACK, GENDER
STEREOTYPING: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 104–130 (2010).
220 For discussion from treaty bodies in regard to the problem of indirect discrimi-
nation, see CESCR (Committee), General Comment No. 20, supra note 2; CEDAW
(Committee), General Recommendation 28, supra note 3; HRC (Committee), Al-
thammer v. Austria, Communication No. 998/2001, ¶¶ 23–25, UN Doc. CCPR/C/
78/D/998/2001 (Aug. 8, 2003); Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
[CERD], L.R. v. Slovakia, Communication No. 31/2003, ¶ 10.4, U.N. Doc.  / C / 66 /
D / 31 / 2003  (Mar. 7, 2005).
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The Author hopes that the above-mentioned analysis from
both the Court and the Commission related to potentially prejudi-
cial different treatment, leads the way to more rulings identifying
and reviewing thoroughly the features of the “rigorous scrutiny” or
“strict scrutiny” test; the “weighty reasons” that need to be ad-
vanced by a state implicated to justify different treatment on the
basis of prohibited factors; and what makes a discriminatory factor
of discrimination merit the application of a “strict” or “rigorous
scrutiny” standard.
C. Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation through the Lens
of Women
One of the most important legacies of the case of Karen Atala
and Daughters is that it exemplifies how discrimination can manifest
itself in the realm of sexual orientation, and how it can happen to a
woman at many levels.221 This individual and concrete case illustra-
tion is crucial at this stage in the definition of state obligations ori-
ented to guarantee women’s rights, in order to foster the adequate
and effective state implementation of standards at the national
level.222 The case of Karen Atala evidences the many facets of dis-
crimination, its varied intersections, the settings and sectors that
perpetrate it, and its casualties. It also offers a female face to dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation, as its main victims
are women and girls.223
Karen Atala was deprived of custody of her daughters on the
basis of her cohabitation with a partner of the same sex, and all the
notions and prejudices associated with this kind of living arrange-
ment—a key feature of sexual orientation discrimination. She suf-
fered discrimination as a result of forming a life plan based on a
crucial component of her identity.  At a second level, she was dis-
criminated against as a mother, with the judicial application of so-
cially accepted conceptions of how a good and capable mother
should act.  At a third level, Karen Atala was discriminated against
for her family choices, by selecting a model that does not conform
to convention, devoid of a father figure. This discrimination hap-
221 See generally Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012); Atala, Application,
supra note 27.
222 For a review of the impact that legal standards can have on the administration
of the justice system in regard to violence and discrimination against women, see
IACHR, Legal Standards Related to Gender Equality and Women’s Rights, supra note
17.
223 See id.
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pened within a custody proceeding and was perpetrated by the jus-
tice branch, which sends a powerful message in support of the
marginalization of lesbian and gay parents from a fundamental
human experience. The discrimination that Karen Atala under-
went is striking considering that she is a well-known judge in her
country and most discrimination happens against women from low-
income and rural sectors.224
This exemplification and individualization of cases pertaining
to the specific situation of women is also fundamental in the cur-
rent trend in international human rights law favoring the prohibi-
tion of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
gender identity.225 This marked trend initiated with a line of cases
focusing on the right to privacy and the criminalization of consen-
sual homosexual conduct226, and has transitioned into a more
nuanced analysis of the obligations not to discriminate and to guar-
antee equality in contexts such as the family, the employment sec-
tor, in pension benefits, and in custody settings, in order to prevent
contravention of the right to equality, the obligation not to dis-
criminate, and the protection of the right to privacy of persons.227
This line of cases also includes a tendency to grant civil, political,
economic, social, and cultural rights to homosexual persons analo-
gous to those guaranteed to heterosexual persons.228 The Euro-
pean Court has also started ruling on issues related to gender
224 See generally THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOMENT REPORT 2012, supra note 10;
IACHR, The Work, Education, and Resources of Women, supra note 9.
225 For more discussion of legal developments pertaining to discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, see Michael O’Flaherty & John Fisher, Sexual Orientation,
Gender Identity, and International Human Rights Law: Contextualizing the Yogyakarta Princi-
ples, 82 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 207 (2008).
226 See e.g., HRC (Committee), Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Mar. 31, 1994); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 7525/76 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1981); S.L. v. Austria, App. No. 45330/99 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 2003).
227 See, e.g., HRC (Committee), Young v. Australia, Communication No. 941/2000,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/C/941/2000 (Aug. 6, 2003); Smith and Grady v. United King-
dom, App. Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, ¶¶ 94–112, 136 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999); Lustig-
Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 31417/96 and 32377/96 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1999).
228 See, e.g., HRC (Committee), Young, Communication No. 941/2000; Karner v.
Austria, App. No. 40016/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Con-
stitutional Court] enero 28, 2008, Sentencia C-029/09 (Colom.); Corte Constitucional
[C.C.] [Constitutional Court] abril 16, 2007, Sentencia C-336/08 (Colom.); Corte
Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court] febrero 7, 2007, Sentencia C-075/07
(Colom.); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court] octubre 3, 2007,
Sentencia C-811/07 (Colom.); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court]
septiembre 18, 2008, Sentencia T-912/08 (Colom.); M. v. H., [1999] S.C.R. 3, 6
(Can.); Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.R. 513, 603 (Can.).
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identity and the same has been consistently recognized as a prohib-
ited factor of discrimination, although at a slower pace than sexual
orientation.229
The case of Karen Atala and Daughters is also noteworthy from
the perspective of women’s rights because it shows how traditional
conceptions of motherhood can be intertwined with prejudices re-
lated to sexual orientation in a given custody case, such that they
trigger human rights violations in an area traditionally relegated to
the decision-making of domestic tribunals.230  The Inter-American
Court skillfully recognizes this issue in its decision by rejecting as
illegitimate the arguments presented by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Chile alluding to a supposed privileging of interests, in
Karen Atala’s choice to live with a partner of the same sex.231 The
Court emphasizes how unreasonable it considers it to be that the
justice system would expect Karen Atala to sacrifice a crucial part of
her identity to retain custody of her daughters.232  For the Court, to
expect that a mother conditions her life options for her children,
advances a traditional conception of the social role of women as
mothers, where it is expected socially that women undertake the
main responsibility for the raising of their children, thereby re-
nouncing a crucial part of their identity.233 The Commission itself
in the report refers to how the Supreme Judicial Court of Chile’s
ruling sent a stereotypical message “equating homosexuality with
maternal inadequacy.”234
There have been cases ruled by the international community
related to custody matters delving into sexual orientation issues,
but these have mostly focused on the situation of homosexual male
parents, and not necessarily on women.235 Probably the most well-
known is the case of Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, decided by
the European Court of Human Rights, where said tribunal found
that a difference in treatment based on the sexual orientation of
229 See, e.g., Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95 (Eur. Ct. H R. 2002);
see also Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, The Yogyakarta Principles, supra note 133; HRC (Coun-
cil) Res. 17/19, Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, 17th Sess.,
May 30–June 17, 2007, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1 (June 15, 2011).
230 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶¶ 139–140 (Feb. 24, 2010).
231 Id.
232 Id. ¶ 139.
233 Id. ¶ 140.
234 Id. ¶¶ 98, 116.
235 The Author notes, however, that there have been important decisions from in-
ternational bodies—such as the European Court of Human Rights—related to the
adoption of children by women in same-sex relationships. See, e.g., E.B. v. France, App.
No. 43546/02, ¶ 91 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008).
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either of the parents in the context of a tuition proceeding violated
article 8 (right to a private and family life) in relation to article 14
(non-discrimination on the basis of sex and gender) of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights.236
The facts of this case are very similar to those in the case of
Karen Atala and Daughters, and both the Commission and the Court
relied heavily on this judgment in their respective rulings.237 In
Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta, the father was deprived of the custody of
his daughter by means of a Court of Appeals ruling that echoes
many of the same values, stereotypes, and traditional notions in the
judgment issued by the Supreme Court of Chile in the case of
Karen Atala and Daughters.238
It is well accepted internationally that traditional notions of
the role of motherhood, what constitutes a family, and the artificial
assignment of social roles within this institution, have been applied
historically to the detriment of women, exposing them to an infer-
236 See Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
1999).
237 See Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶
95; Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 106.
238 Some of the considerations advanced by the relevant court in the custody deci-
sion were:
Even if that were not the case, however, we think that custody of the
child should be awarded to the mother.  The fact that the child’s father,
who has come to terms with his homosexuality, wishes to live with an-
other man is a reality which has to be accepted. It is well known that
society is becoming more and more tolerant of such situations. How-
ever, it cannot be argued that an environment of this kind is the healthi-
est and best suited to a child’s psychological, social and mental
development, especially given the dominant model in our society, as the
appellant rightly points out. The child should live in a family environ-
ment, a traditional Portuguese family, which is certainly not the set-up
her father has decided to enter into, since he is living with another man
as if they were man and wife. It is not our task here to determine
whether homosexuality is or is not an illness or whether it is a sexual
orientation towards persons of the same sex. In both cases it is an abnor-
mality and children should not grow up in the shadow of abnormal situ-
ations; such are the dictates of human nature and let us remember that
it is [the applicant] himself who acknowledged this when, in his initial
application of 5 July 1990, he stated that he had definitively left the
marital home to go and live with a boyfriend, a decision which is not
normal according to common criteria.
Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 30.
The European Court considered that this language from the Lisbon Court of
Appeals, far from “being merely clumsy or unfortunate” as the Government advanced,
suggested that the applicant’s homosexuality was a decisive factor in the final deci-
sion. Therefore, the European Court found that the Court of Appeals made a distinc-
tion on account of the father’s sexual orientation; a distinction not acceptable under
the European Convention. Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 35.
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ior and discriminatory treatment in society.239 The Commission it-
self has repeatedly noted the alarming consequences of the
discrimination perpetrated against women and stereotypical no-
tions of their social and family roles, including exposure to acts of
violence against women, as well as their repetition.240
In this light, the Author hopes that both the Inter-American
Commission and the Court’s rulings in the case Karen Atala and
Daughters promote a discussion of the intricacies and content of the
obligations to protect, respect, and fulfill the right of women to live
free from any form of discrimination perpetrated by the judiciary,
particularly in family law cases.241 In this regard, the CEDAW Com-
mittee has underscored that protection against discrimination
should be provided by competent tribunals, and enforced by sanc-
tions and remedies, where appropriate.242 States parties to CEDAW
should also “ensure that all Government bodies and organs are
fully aware of the principles of equality and non-discrimination on
the basis of sex and gender,” through adequate training and aware-
ness-raising programs.243 As mentioned earlier, the Committee has
239 See IACHR, Status of Women in the Americas, OEA/SER.L./V/II.98, doc. 17
rev. 13 (Oct. 13, 1998); U.N. Secretary-General, 1999 World Survey on the Role of Women
in Development: Globalization, Gender, and Work: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc.
A/54/227 (Aug. 18, 1999); CEDAW (Committee), General Recommendation No. 21,
supra note 127, ¶¶ 11–12; Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 4/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 32 (2001).
240 Morales de Sierra, Case 11.625, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111,
doc. 20 rev. ¶¶ 35, 36; Marı́a da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 55
(2001) (noting disproportionate exposure of female victims to violence and state’s
failure to prosecute perpetrators); IACHR, Access to Justice for Women Victims of
Violence in the Americas, supra note 205, ¶¶ 59–122 (reporting on violence and dis-
crimination against women and the state’s duty to amend discriminatory norms, prac-
tices, and policies); González v. Mexico (Cotton Field), Preliminary Objection, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶¶ 138–143
(Nov. 16, 2009) (discussing widespread murder and disappearances of Mexican wo-
men and girls as acts of femicide).
241 CEDAW (Committee), General Recommendation No. 28, supra note 5, ¶ 9. The
Committee has commented generally on the content of the duties to “respect, pro-
tect, and fulfill.” The obligation to “respect” requires states parties to refrain from
adopting laws, policies, regulations, programs, administrative procedures, and institu-
tional structures that directly or indirectly result in the denial of women’s equal enjoy-
ment of their civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. The obligation to
“protect” requires states parties to eliminate customs and other practices that
prejudice and perpetuate the notion of the inferiority or superiority of either of the
sexes and of stereotyped roles for men and women. The obligation to “fulfill” requires
that states parties take steps to ensure that women and men enjoy equal rights de jure
and de facto, including, where appropriate, the adoption of temporary special mea-
sures, among other interventions.
242 Id., ¶¶ 17–18.
243 Id., ¶¶ 19–26.
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also clarified that CEDAW’s obligations extend not only to sex-
based discrimination, but also to that which is gender-based, in-
cluding sexual orientation.244
The Commission in its application requested from the Inter-
American Court non-repetition measures in order to prevent dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the future from
the judiciary in Chile, including the adoption of legislation, public
policies, programs, and initiatives to “prohibit and eradicate dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation in all areas of the
exercise of public power, including the administration of jus-
tice.”245  The Court in its ruling echoed the rectification measures
it ordered in its landmark Cotton Field judgment,246 considering
that the reparations ordered should have as their objective the
transformation of the social context of discrimination which facili-
tated discrimination against Karen Atala.247
The Author hopes that the Court in future judgments related
to discrimination builds on this case and its previous judgments, by
illustrating in a more concrete fashion which kinds of measures
can be implemented by a state within its justice system to end
discrimination, and to prevent its repetition, and measures to guar-
antee the institutionalization and sustainability of remedial
measures.248
244 Id., ¶¶ 4, 5, 17.
245 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 168.
246 For more discussion, see Celorio, The Rights of Women in the Inter-American System
of Human Rights, supra note 20; see also Cotton Field, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 205, ¶¶ 446–543 (Nov. 16, 2009).
247 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶¶ 267–272 (Feb. 24, 2012). The Court alluded
to how the acts of discrimination reviewed in the case of Karen Atala and M., V., and
R. were related to the reproduction of stereotypes which are associated to the struc-
tural and historical discrimination suffered by sexual minorities, particularly in mat-
ters related to access to justice, and national laws. Therefore, the Court ordered
measures related to training of public officials in regards to: i) human rights, sexual
orientation, and non-discrimination; ii) the protection of the rights of the LGBTI
community; and iii) discrimination, overcoming gender stereotypes against the
LGBTI population. The courses should be directed to public officials at the regional
and national levels, in particular to justice officials from all areas and levels of the
justice branch.
248 See, e.g., González, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 495; Fernán-
dez Ortega v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215 (Aug. 30, 2010); Rosendo Cantú and Other
v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, ¶ 34 (Aug. 31, 2010); IACHR, Access to Justice for
Women Victims of Violence in the Americas, supra note 205, ¶ 44.
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D. Discrimination, the Right to Privacy, and the Family Context:
Positive and Negative State Obligations Under International
Human Rights Law
One of the key contributions of the Commission and Court’s
decisions in the case of Karen Atala and Daughters is their analysis
related to the link between the prohibition of discrimination and
the rights to privacy and to protection of the family under interna-
tional human rights law.249
In regard to the right to privacy, firstly, the Inter-American
Court coupled its pronouncements related to discrimination in the
custody proceeding, by adding how they had repercussions for the
right to privacy of Karen Atala under article 11.2 of the American
Convention.250 In particular it referred to how the proceeding ad-
vanced a stereotyped vision of the scope of the sexual orientation
of Karen Atala, generating an arbitrary interference in her private
life, since sexual orientation constitutes a part of the intimacy of a
person, and is not relevant to review of aspects of paternity or
motherhood.251
Second, the Court referred to the disciplinary investigation of
Karen Atala by the judicial branch, and how it had interfered arbi-
trarily with her right to a private life in contravention of article 11.2
of the American Convention.252 The Court perceived no nexus be-
tween a desire to protect the image of the “judicial branch” and
Mrs. Atala’s sexual orientation.253 The Court established in particu-
lar that sexual orientation and its exercise cannot constitute, under
any circumstance, an adequate foundation to undertake a discipli-
nary proceeding, since there is no correlation between a person’s
fulfillment of professional duties and her sexual orientation.254
The Commission for its part presents a multi-layered analysis
related to the right to privacy in its merits decision, applicable not
only to sexual orientation issues, but to the exercise of human
rights in general, including those pertaining to women.255 The
Commission innovatively amplifies the areas pertaining to a wo-
man’s private sphere—or what international legal bodies denomi-
nate as an “intimate zone” of decision-making—shielded from
249 Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶¶
109–123.
250 Id. ¶ 167.
251 Id.
252 Id. ¶ 221.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶¶ 109–117.
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arbitrary state intervention.256 Some of the zones identified are the
development of a person’s identity, personality, aspirations, and
decisions over his or her sexual life, and his or her personal and
family relations.257 The Commission refers to them not only as
components of this “intimate zone,” but also goes further and asso-
ciates them with the autonomy of an individual, and his or her life
plan.258 This analysis leads the Commission to conclude that “sex-
ual orientation constitutes a fundamental component of the pri-
vate life of an individual,” which should be free from arbitrary and
abusive interferences by the state.259 It also specifies that there is a
clear nexus between the sexual orientation and the development
and life plan of a person, “including his or her personality, and
relations with other human beings.”260
The Commission’s decision also smartly establishes a link be-
tween discrimination, prejudices, and stereotypes, and how these
can be used as a pretext or background for a state’s arbitrary and
unjustified intervention in a person’s zone of intimacy.261 The
Commission applies a rigorous standard of review—demanding
the presentation of “weighty and convincing reasons”—to justify a
state’s intervention in this protected zone on the basis of an indi-
vidual’s sexual orientation, echoing precedent from the European
Court of Human Rights.262 This analysis is significant since it lays
the groundwork for future cases that may be dealt with by the
Court pertaining to areas fundamental to women’s rights and their
right to privacy, such as the ability to undertake fundamental deci-
sions related to their reproductive rights and health.263
The Author also considers the Commission’s decision useful
to women’s rights in the realm of privacy in setting limits on the
assessment of a person’s sexual life in a custody proceeding—a vi-
256 For more analysis, see, for example, the Commission’s analysis in Morales de
Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 4/01, OEA/
Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 47 (2001); X v. Argentina, Case 10.506, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 38/96, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 91 (1997).
257 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶¶ 110–11.
258 Id.
259 Id. ¶ 111.
260 Id.
261 Id. ¶ 115.
262 Id. ¶¶ 111, 113.
263 See, e.g., Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, Case 12.361, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 85/10, ¶¶ 72–76 (2010); I.V. v. Bolivia, Petition 270-07, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 40/08, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.134 doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶¶ 4, 80 (2009).
See also Artavia Murillo (in vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica. Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶¶ 43-
100 (November 28, 2012).
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tal part of a woman’s autonomy and life plan.264 The Commission
recognizes that “it is not only reasonable, but necessary, for a judi-
cial authority” to ponder several factors to determine a parent’s
capacity to exercise custody over his or her children—factors which
may include “the private, sexual and emotional life” of the persons
involved.265 The examination of these factors, however, should be
consistent with states’ international obligations, and the elements
examined must be relevant to a mother’s capacity to exercise cus-
tody over her children.266
The decisions of the Commission and the Court in the case of
Karen Atala and Daughters can also constitute a very important con-
tribution to the treatment of the “family” in international human
rights law.267 Probably the most palpable legacy will be felt in three
areas: i) the conceptualization of the family model in international
human rights law; ii) the connection between the right to privacy
and protection of the family under the American Convention; and
iii) when an international legal body should enter and assess cases
related to family law.268
The family has been the central character in much of the dis-
crimination that women have suffered historically.269 It is widely
recognized today that women have faced substantial limitations in
the exercise of their civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights within the family, leading to discrimination and its extreme
forms, such as domestic violence.270 At the root of this discrimina-
tion has been women’s social assignment of child-rearing roles, re-
quiring them to tend to the home within the so-called “private
sphere”—a space traditionally undervalued in society.271 CEDAW
recognizes this disadvantage in its article 16, prohibiting all forms
of discrimination against women in matters related to marriage
264 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶¶ 69, 114.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 See Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶¶ 167–178 (Feb. 24, 2012); Atala, Applica-
tion, supra note 27, ¶¶ 118–123.
268 Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶¶ 118–123.
269 See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, In Depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against
Women, ¶¶ 69–91, 111–125, U.N. Doc. A/61/122/Add.1 (July 6, 2006); World Health
Org., Multi-Country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women: Initial
Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women’s Responses, at 3 (2005); Elimination of
Domestic Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 58/147, U.N. Doc. A/Res/58/147
(Feb. 19, 2004).
270 See Elimination of Domestic Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 58/147, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/58/147 (Feb. 19, 2004).
271 CEDAW (Committee), General Recommendation No. 21, supra note 127, ¶ 11.
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and its dissolution, including the custody of children, the adminis-
tration of property, the selection of a family name, profession, and
occupation, among other issues.272 CEDAW solidifies the important
notion that human rights violations can happen in the realm of the
family, and that the state has obligations in the protection of family
members, especially those more at risk of abuses, such as wo-
men.273 CEDAW has also broadened the concept of the “family” in
its general recommendations and reaffirmed that women should
be treated by the state with equality and justice in all models.274
In furthering these principles, the Court in groundbreaking
fashion determined that the American Convention does not envi-
sion a closed conception of the family, and does not advance a
“traditional model.”275 The Court considers that the concept of
family life is not only to be reduced to marriage, but extends to all
other de facto family ties where the parties have a common life
outside of marriage.276 In this case, the Court deemed that the lan-
guage used by the Supreme Judicial Court of Chile—the supposed
need of the girls to grow in a “family structured normally and ap-
preciated in the social medium,” and not in an “exceptional fam-
ily”—reflected a limited and stereotyped perception of the concept
of the family which has no basis in the American Convention.277
In similarity to the European Court of Human Rights’ judg-
ment in the case of Schalk and Kkopf v. Austria,278 the Commission
in its decision also treats the unit of Karen Atala and her daughters
as a “family,” even though it does not conform to traditional social
notions, and she is a homosexual cohabiting with a partner of the
272 See CEDAW (Convention), supra note 2, art. 16.
273 See generally CEDAW (Committee), General Recommendation No. 21, supra note
127.
274 Id. The CEDAW (Committee) has established that:
The form and concept of the family can vary from State to State, and
even between regions within a State. Whatever form it takes, and
whatever the legal system, religion, custom or tradition within the coun-
try, the treatment of women in the family both at law and in private
must accord with the principles of equality and justice for all people, as
article 2 of the Convention requires.
Id. ¶ 13.
275 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 142 (Feb. 24, 2012).
276 See id.
277 Id. ¶ 145.
278 In its judgment in the case of Schalk and Kopf, the European Court of Human
Rights found that “a same-sex couple living in a stable de facto partnership, falls within
the notion of ‘family life’ under Article 8” of the European Convention of Human
Rights. See Schalk v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, ¶ 94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010).
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same sex.279 The Commission holds that the change in custody re-
gime not only interfered in an arbitrary fashion in an intimate
zone in the life of Karen Atala, but it also abusively impinged in her
“family life plan,”280 and emphasizes the right of Karen Atala to
establish family relations based on her sexual orientation, even
though her choices might not be tolerated by a social majority.281
This principle is fundamental for the protection of women’s rights,
in benefit of those women forming families which are not tradi-
tional, such as same-sex couples, single-heads of households,
mixed-race households, and widows.282
The Inter-American Court in its judgment also delves into the
connection between the rights to privacy and the family, and how
the family nucleus conformed by both Karen Atala and her daugh-
ters, previous to the onset of the custody proceedings, was pro-
tected by both articles 11.2 and 17 of the American Convention,
even though the girls also had a family relationship with their fa-
ther.283 The Court considered that a family nucleus existed since
there was frequent, personal, and affectionate contact between
Karen Atala, her partner, her oldest son, and her three daugh-
ters.284 Therefore, it concluded that the unsuitability of the custody
measure also constituted an arbitrary interference in the rights to
private and family life under articles 11.2 and 17.1, in relation to
article 1.1 of the American Convention, to the prejudice of Karen
Atala and her daughters.285 The Commission in its ruling also rec-
ognizes this intimate connection between the right to privacy and
protection of the family under the American Convention and inter-
national human rights law.286
The rulings of the Court and the Commission also bring ad-
ded value to when international legal bodies are supposed to inter-
vene in a family law matter.287 International legal bodies have read
a right to protect the family into international human rights law—
and this right is also contained in several treaties—but they are
279 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶ 116.
280 Id. ¶ 115.
281 Id. ¶ 116; see also CEDAW (Committee), General Recommendation 21, supra
note 127, ¶ 13.
282
283 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶¶ 169–178 (Feb. 24, 2012).
284 Id. ¶ 177.
285 Id. ¶ 178.
286 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶¶ 118–119, 122–123.
287 See id. ¶¶ 68–69; Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 239, ¶¶ 64–66.
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slowly shedding light on what kind of state interventions are neces-
sary in this regard.288 Several tribunals have highlighted the double
nature of the right to protection of the family, involving: a) a “posi-
tive obligation”—which entails protecting the family as a funda-
mental unit in society; and b) a “negative obligation”—involving
the duty to abstain from arbitrary and abusive interferences in this
sphere.289 Many of the efforts from international legal bodies have
been devoted to shedding light on the scope of state obligations
toward cases of violence against women, domestic violence, and
child abuse, and the definition of the contours of the reach of the
obligations to “prevent,”290 “protect,”291 and to act with “due dili-
gence” in this regard.292 The Commission and Court rulings in the
case of Karen Atala and Daughters are clear in that an international
tribunal should intervene in a custody matter—traditionally rele-
gated to the domestic sphere—when discriminatory notions and
stereotypes have been the basis for the resolution of a custody case,
in lieu of an objective assessment of the capacity of the parents
involved to care for their children.293
The Commission’s decision in the case of Karen Atala and
Daughters is also key in that it displays how international human
rights law and state obligations toward the family evolve over time,
288 See, e.g., Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion
OC-17/02, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 17, ¶ 66 (Aug. 28, 2002).
289 See, e.g., id.; Escher v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 200, ¶ 113 (July 6, 2009).
290 See, e.g., Jessica Lenahan v. United States (Gonzales), Case 12.626, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 80/11, ¶¶ 119, 124, 129 (2011); Marı́a da Penha Maia
Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/
Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 56 (2001); Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, ¶¶ 78,
79, 84, 189–190 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009); E and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No.
33218/96, ¶¶ 88, 97, 115 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002); Z and Others v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 29392/95, ¶ 73 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001).
291 See, e.g., Gonzales, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 80/11, ¶¶
111, 128, 129; Marı́a da Penha Maia Fernandes, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶¶
53, 54, 58; Opuz, App. No. 33401/02, ¶¶ 149, 189–190; E and Others, App. No. 33218/
96, ¶¶ 88, 99, 110, 111, 116; Z and Others, App. No. 29392/95, ¶¶ 73, 74, 109, 111;
CEDAW (Committee), Yildirim v. Austria, Communication No. 6/2005, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005, ¶ 3.1 (Oct. 1, 2007); CEDAW (Committee), Goekce v.
Austria, Communication No. 5/2005, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005, ¶ 3.1
(Aug. 6, 2007).
292 See, e.g., Gonzales, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 80/11, ¶¶
111, 124, 128, 129; Opuz, App. No. 33401/02, ¶¶ 78, 79, 84, 149, 189–190; CEDAW
(Committee), Yilidirim, Communication No. 6/2005, ¶ 3.5; CEDAW (Committee),
Goekce, Communication No. 5/2005 ¶ 12.1.5.
293 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶¶ 68–69; Atala Riffo and Daughters v.
Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239,
¶¶ 64–66 (Feb. 24, 2012).
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and should be interpreted in light of current social realities.294 It
illustrates how the decisions issued by the regional and universal
regional human rights systems should respond to the passage of
time and actual needs, based on the given features of social dis-
crimination at a point in time.295 It is also key to consider the val-
ues of the international system at the relevant historical stage of
interpretation.296
The Author considers that one fundamental message of these
two decisions is that the contemporary values of the international
human rights law system—pluralism, equality, tolerance, and jus-
tice—should also apply to the family as well as to the behavior of
public authorities toward this institution and its members.
E. Toward a Better Understanding of Children’s Rights in Family
Matters: Deconstructing the “Best Interests of the Child” as an
Objective in Custody Cases
The Author considers that one of the most important legacies
of the Inter-American Court judgment in the case of Karen Atala
and Daughters is the analysis it presents related to the best interests
of the child principle, and its advancement in matters pertaining to
their custody and care.297 The Court had previously analyzed the
content of article 19 of the American Convention and the principle
of special protection contained in said provision.298 In this frame-
work, it had referred and applied the notion of an international
corpus juris related to the rights of the child, including the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child and other regional instruments.299
The Court had also established how the separation of a child from
his or her household must be exceptional, and preferably
294 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶¶ 118–123.
295 Id. ¶¶ 81, 90.
296 Id.
297 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 ¶¶ 100–155 (Feb. 24, 2012).
298 See, e.g., Juridical Status and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion, OC
17/02, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 17, ¶ 60 (Aug. 28, 2002); Juvenile Reeducation
Inst. v. Paraguay, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 112, ¶ 147 (Sept. 2, 2004); Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers
v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 110,
¶¶ 163–164, 171 (July 8, 2004); Bulacio v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 110, ¶ 133 (Sept. 18, 2003); Villagrán
Morales v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 191
(Nov. 19, 1999).
299 See cases cited supra note 298.
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temporary.300
The Court, however, in the case of Karen Atala and Daughters
does push the boundary of the principle of special protection in
custody cases, adding groundbreaking content related to its link
with the obligation not to discriminate in international human
rights law.301 The Court advanced a series of human rights princi-
ples that are paramount for tribunals to consider when issuing cus-
tody decisions with long-lasting effects on the children and the
parents involved, in harmony with human rights and the principle
of non-discrimination.302
In this regard, the Court found that the discriminatory treat-
ment suffered by Karen Atala had repercussions on the girls, as it
became the foundation for the custody decision that ended up sep-
arating them from their mother.303 This decision discriminated not
only against Karen Atala, but also against M., V., and R. in contra-
vention to article 24 of the American Convention, in relation to
articles 19 and 1.1 of the same instrument.304 This is a finding of
utmost importance as it skillfully clarifies that discrimination
against any of the parents in a custody case does not further the
best interest of the child and serves to discriminate against the chil-
dren involved.305  Moreover, the best interests of the child as an
objective, cannot be used to discriminate, as this can harm both
the children and the parents at issue.306
The Court also skillfully refers to the standard of harm that
must be applied in cases that could result in the removal of chil-
dren from the custody of either parent.307 Harm that can be a de-
termining factor in a custody decision needs to be real and proven,
not speculative, imaginary, or based on stereotypes.308 A nexus
needs to be present between the conduct of the parent and the
alleged harm on the development of the child involved—an assess-
ment which is key to ensure that decisions are not based in stereo-
300 Juridical Status and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) No. 17, ¶ 77.
301 See e.g., Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239,
¶¶ 100–155.
302 Id.
303 Id. ¶¶ 131, 133.
304 Id. ¶¶ 123, 131, 133, 153.
305 Id. ¶ 123.
306 Id. ¶ 127; see also Comm. on the Rights of the Child [CRC (Committee)], Gen-
eral Comment No. 7, Implementing Child Rights in Early Adulthood, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/GC/7 /Rev.1 ¶ 7 (Sept. 20, 2006).
307 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶¶ 119–128 (Feb. 24, 2012).
308 Id., ¶¶ 109–110.
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types.309 The Court bases its analysis on a variety of sources, such as
judgments issued by high courts in other countries in the Ameri-
cas,310 and studies submitted to the Court by experts showing that
children are not harmed from living with homosexual parents.311
Lastly, the Court advances analysis related to the content of
the children’s right to be heard in legal processes that concern
them.312 The Court incorporates this element into the content of
article 8.1313 and as a judicial protection and guarantee by refer-
encing article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
along with the General Comment issued by the Committee on the
Rights of the Child interpreting the scope of this provision.314
The Court reiterates some of the principles advanced by the
Committee on the Rights of the Child related to the content of the
right to be heard, including: i) that the point of departure should
not be that the child cannot express his or her own opinions; ii)
that the child only needs to have sufficient understanding to be
capable of forming adequately his or her own opinion over this
issue; iii) that the child can express his or her opinions without
pressure and can choose whether she or he wants to be heard; iv)
that those responsible for hearing the child inform him or her of
the issues, options, and possible decisions that could be adopted
and their consequences; v) that the capacity of the child should be
assessed to duly take into account his or her opinions; vi) to com-
municate to the child the influence those opinions have had in the
process; and vii) that the level of understanding of a child is not
necessarily tied to his or her biological age.315
The Court also establishes that the right to be heard includes a
correlative right for the children’s opinions to be taken into ac-
count, in function of her or his age and maturity level.316  This
means that the court at issue needs to explain in the judgment the
process and modalities it adopted for hearing the child, and how it
309 Id., ¶ 125.
310 Id., ¶ 126.
311 Id., ¶ 128.
312 Id., ¶ 196.
313 The Commission referred to M., V., and R’s right to be heard under article 19
of the American Convention. See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶¶ 124–136.
314 Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶¶
196–98.
315 Id., ¶ 198. CRC (Committee), General Comment No. 12, The Right of the Child
to be Heard, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/12 ¶¶ 20–21, 25, 28, 30 (July 20, 2009) [herein-
after CRC (Committee), General Comment No. 12].
316 Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 200.
386 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:335
takes into account her or his declarations and preferences.317 In
this particular case, the Court found that the girls’ right to be
heard was violated since the Supreme Court never explained in its
judgment how it incorporated their preferences, in contrast with
the lower courts.318
Another very interesting note about the content of the right to
be heard in the case of Karen Atala and Daughters is that the Court
actually made the effort to interview M., V., and R. about this pro-
cess.319 The interests of the girls had been represented before the
Commission and the Court at all times by their mother and the
Petitioners and later representatives.320 But the Court noted that
there was no manifestation in the file before it evidencing that the
girls were in agreement with the representation of either of the
parents before the Court.321
Curiously though, the Court provides minor details in its judg-
ment regarding this diligence—which is a first for the Court in
children’s rights cases—only indicating that it was undertaken by
personnel from the Court Secretariat and the psychiatrist of the
girls.322 The judgment indicates that the hearing was private, with-
out the presence of either of the parents, conducted more as a
separate conversation with each child.323 The girls were 12, 13, and
17 years-old at the time of this diligence, and two of them partici-
pated.324 The Court limits its analysis to stating that the girls knew
and understood themes related to the alleged violations in which
they have been identified as victims, and two of the girls manifested
their own opinions regarding this case, as well as some of their ex-
pectations and interests.325 The Author notes that the judgment
does not add any more analysis of how the children’s opinions
were considered in the judgment, and the Court notes the reserved
nature of the diligence.326
The Committee on the Rights of the Child is very clear in its
General Comment No. 12 that the right of all children to be heard
and to be taken seriously constitutes one of the fundamental values
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, along with the rights
317 Id. ¶ 208.
318 Id.
319 Id. ¶¶ 67–71.
320 See Atala, Application, supra note 27, ¶¶ 10–39.
321 Atala Riffo and Daughters, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 67.
322 Id. ¶ 69.
323 Id. ¶¶ 69–70.
324 Id. ¶¶ 68–70.
325 Id.
326 Id. ¶¶ 67–71,196–200.
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to non-discrimination, the right to life and development, and the
primary consideration of the child’s best interest.327 The Commit-
tee also explains how article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child not only establishes a right itself, but should also be con-
sidered in the interpretation and implementation of all other Con-
vention rights.328 If the child’s participation is to be effective and
meaningful, it needs to be understood as a process, and not as an
isolated event.329 The Committee also urges states parties to pay
special attention to the right of the girl child to be heard, to re-
ceive support, if needed, to voice her view, and her view to be given
due weight, as gender stereotypes and patriarchal values under-
mine and place severe limitations on girls in the enjoyment of the
right set forth in article 12.330
The Author is hopeful that the Court will illustrate the mean-
ing of these principles through its future resolution of children’s
rights cases.331 It will also be important to study in the coming years
the impact of this diligence on the Commission’s processing of in-
dividual cases related to the rights of the child, and other human
rights concerns which affect them.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The obligations not to discriminate and to guarantee equality
constitute a basic pillar of the international human rights law sys-
tem. Therefore, a more nuanced understanding of their content is
needed to fully understand the adequate application of interna-
tional human rights law at the national level, and the development
of more legal standards in this area in the future.
Applying a flexible interpretation to clauses such as article 1.1
of the American Convention is a step in the right direction to pro-
viding important guidelines and insights to states as to how to ad-
dress the needs of groups which have been traditionally
327 CRC (Committee), General Comment No. 12, supra note 315, ¶ 2.
328 Id.
329 Id. ¶ 133.
330 Id. ¶ 77.
331 See, e.g., Fornerón and Daughter v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 242, ¶¶ 20–148 (Apr. 27, 2012).  In this
case, submitted by the Inter-American Commission before the Court on November
29, 2010, it was alleged that Mr. Fornerón’s biological daughter was given in adoption
to a married couple without the father’s consent, who had no access to the child. It
was also claimed that the State had not ordered any visiting rights regime despite the
multiple requests presented by Mr. Fornerón in more than ten years. See also
Fornerón and Anibal Fornerón v. Argentina, Case 12.584, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 83/10, ¶¶ 22–24 (2010).
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discriminated against in their societies.  It also opens the door to
the identification, recognition, and thorough analysis of factors of
discrimination that have yet to be recognized by the international
community. Each ground of discrimination has its own complexity
that needs to be reviewed by international bodies in order for
states to have insight into the reach of their obligations to address
discrimination, and how these concepts have evolved.
Within this framework, it is important not to forget that wo-
men have been a central character among those affected by
marginalization and exclusion at the global level.  The elimination
of discrimination against women is widely recognized as a pillar
and precondition for the full guarantee of women’s rights. The
concept of discrimination on the basis of sex has evolved since the
onset of the human rights system from a biology-based notion, to
the persistence of stereotypes and social patterns that promote the
disadvantaged treatment of women. Toward these, a state’s obliga-
tions are comprehensive and have different layers.
As the Commission has stated in the past, the continuum of
human rights obligations to address discrimination against women
is not only negative in nature; it also requires positive action from
states.332 It requires the guarantee of the equality of women in the
law; the elimination of norms that are either discriminatory, or
have a discriminatory impact on women; the eradication of dis-
criminatory practices and stereotypes; and the organization of the
entire state structure to confront discrimination with due dili-
gence. Moreover, it is important that international judgments con-
tinue to illustrate how discrimination against women can be
indirect and inherent in laws, policies, and judicial decisions issued
with the “so-called” objective to protect the best interests of the
children involved. The state has the immediate obligation to or-
ganize its state structure in order to prevent and address these dis-
criminatory patterns with due diligence, and the intervention of
international legal bodies is paramount in illustrating how to safe-
guard this guarantee at the national level.
Moreover, a thorough understanding of the limiting effect of
intersectional discrimination in the exercise of women’s civil, polit-
ical, economic, social, and cultural rights cannot be underesti-
mated. It demands from the state the recognition of sectors which
are at a disadvantage in the exercise of their rights—such as wo-
men, children, indigenous peoples, people of African descent, per-
332 See Jessica Lenahan v. United States (Gonzales), Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 80/11, ¶ 117 (2011).
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sons living in conditions of poverty, migrants, women affected by
disabilities, etc.—and to adopt policies to redress this past history
of discrimination.333
Since the obligations entailed are broadly encompassing, the
development of more legal standards is needed—refined by inter-
national bodies—defining the content and scope of the obligations
not to discriminate and to guarantee equality in individual cases.
Due to the complex nature of the issue of discrimination, states
need concrete guidance on how to best comply with the individual
obligations contained in instruments such as the American Con-
vention, the Inter-American Convention, the Inter-American Con-
vention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of
Violence Against Women, and CEDAW, among other international
treaties.  Moreover, the definition of appropriate strategies at the
national level to adequately and effectively implement these legal
standards requires the participation of the relevant disadvantaged
groups.
In this regard, the further definition by the Inter-American
Commission and the Court of the content and scope of the obliga-
tions not to discriminate and to guarantee equality in individual
cases—such as in the case of Karen Atala and Daughters—is para-
mount to the development of adequate and effective international
legal standards pertaining to discrimination and its pernicious ef-
fect on women. A more nuanced and concrete understanding of
the obligations contained in articles 1.1 and 24 of the American
Convention is also fundamental to the protection of human rights
in general in the hemisphere of the Americas. In this regard, it is
key that the decisions of the Commission and the Court pertaining
to the case of Karen Atala and Daughters are studied together, as
each provides its own contribution to the development of stan-
dards in the realms of discrimination and equality.
For the Author, it is important that the Inter-American sys-
tem—along with the universal system of human rights—can re-
spond to the evolution of discrimination over time, serving to
create spaces and avenues where the needs of historically marginal-
ized groups are addressed.
333 IACHR, The Work, Education, and Resources of Women, supra note 9, ¶¶
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